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DOCTORS, PATIENTS AND THE
CONSTITUTION: A THEORETICAL




However controversial its transformation, the "right to privacy,"
which first developed as tort law's recognition of an individual's right to
avoid public disclosure of personal facts,1 is now firmly established as a
* Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. A.B. 1970, Vassar College;
J.D. 1973, University of California, Berkeley.
I originally presented the substance of this Article on November 11, 1983, as one of three invited
and funded lectures that I delivered as part of the Grand Rounds of the Department of Obstetrics
and Gynecology of the Washington University School of Medicine. As I reworked this material for
publication, I am grateful to have had the benefit of the thoughtful comments of Janet Benshoof,
Herma Hill Kay, Sylvia A. Law, Ronald M. Levin, and Karen L. Tokarz. Their numerous in-
sightful suggestions and criticisms, many but not all of which I adopted, improved my work enor-
mously. The usual disclaimer protects these friends and colleagues from responsibility for my
analysis, opinions, and conclusions.
1. This right owes its earliest explicit recognition to Samuel D. Warren and his then-partner,
Louis D. Brandeis, who subsequently sat on the United States Supreme Court. Warren and Bran-
deis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). Their brief for "an inviolate personality,"
id. at 205, posited that the common law of copyright implicitly protects individuals wishing to shield
their "thoughts, emotions, and sensations," id at 206, from disclosure not only by the "newspaper
enterprise," but also through the use of brand-new technology, eg., "instantaneous photographs"
and "mechanical [eavesdropping or broadcasting] devices," i. at 195. They recommended that
courts award damages in tort in all cases in which defendant breaches plaintiff's right to privacy and
that courts issue injunctions in a limited class of such cases. Id. at 219.
The judicial response was mixed. Compare Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y.
538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902) (rejecting cause of action to enjoin defendant from using plaintiffs portrait)
with Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (recognizing right of
privacy derives from natural law and protects against unwanted publicity of one's portrait). Years
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constitutional liberty protected by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.2 This newer notion of privacy includes the freedom
to decide in large part one's own reproductive destiny. In the United
States Supreme Court's own words, the Constitution shields from unjus-
tified governmental intrusion 3 "the right of privacy,"' 4 "matters so funda-
later the scholarly debate continued, exploring the source and content of the right described by
Warren and Brandeis. For example, Prosser, writing in 1960, found four distinctly different rights
masquerading as a single right to privacy; he concluded that only one of the four, "public disclosure
of private facts," concerned Warren and Brandeis. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIP. L. REv. 383, 389,
392, 398, 401 (1960). Other scholarly formulations of the right to privacy, although differently
phrased, reflect the essence of Prosser's restatement of Warren and Brandeis. See, e.g., Gavison,
Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421,423, 436-37 (1980); Parker, A Definition of Privacy,
27 RuTGERS L. REv. 275, 281 (1974). See also Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Fare-
well to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291 (1983).
2. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions on state action, as we feel
it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy"). The Court recently reaffirmed Roe. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983). The Court may soon address again issues of reproductive
privacy. Diamond v. Charles, 105 S. Ct. 2356 (1985); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985). See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
3. Distinguishing between "justified" and "unjustified" governmental intrusions is no easy
task, given the changing standards of review applied by the Supreme Court. The Court first held
that regulations limiting the right to privacy must serve a compelling state interest, Roe, 410 U.S. at
155, and that no state interest in restricting abortion achieves "the 'compelling' point" during the
first trimester of pregnancy, id. at 163. Despite a subsequent case upholding written-consent and
recordkeeping requirements imposed even on first-trimester abortions, Planned Parenthood of Cen-
tral Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-67, 79-81 (1976), the Court continued to recite the compelling-
state-interest test as the controlling standard. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686
(1977). When the Court applied the rational-basis test in a series of unsuccessful challenges to gov-
ernment programs that subsidized childbirth for indigent women but did not fund abortions, how-
ever, eg., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), it invited
considerable confusion among lower courts, notwithstanding the apparent distinction between laws
that actively impinge on the abortion right and those that call for state inaction. See generally
Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abortion-Funding
Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM, L. REv. 721
(1981). This confusion centered on the appropriate standard of review for evaluating the constitu-
tionality of laws that actively regulate or limit access to abortion even during the first trimester, but
that do not prohibit it entirely. Compare Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (D.N.D. 1980)
(regulations not unduly burdening the abortion decision need only be rationally related to a legiti-
mate state purpose) with Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 1980) (" 'undue burden'
defines the ultimate constitutional issue, not merely the threshold requirement for strict scrutiny"),
supplemented sub nom Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984), prob. jurik noted sub nom.
Diamond v. Charles, 105 S. Ct. 2356 (1985).
The Court's most recent opinions fail to offer a definitive resolution of the problem. They suggest
that only those regulations creating "significant obstacles" to or having a "significant impact" on the
abortion right must serve a compelling state interest and must be "reasonably designed to further
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mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child,"5 "individual autonomy in matters of childbearing,"'6 "an intimate
relation of husband and wife,"'7 "the right of the individuals to use con-
traceptives if they choose to do so,"' and "a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy. '
Whether regarded as a direct descendant of the tort principle or as a
renaissance of the previously discredited constitutional doctrine of sub-
stantive due process,10 modem constitutional privacy 1 logically ought to
that state interest." City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 434
(1983). On the other hand, according to the Court, laws having "no significant impact" or imposing
"only an insignificant burden" on the right must simply further "important health-related state con-
cerns." Id. at 430,435. But on what principled basis can one distinguish "significant" burdens from
"insignificant" ones? Compare Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft,
462 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1983) (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J.) (pathology report require-
ment "does not significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision") with at 497-98 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.) (cannot agree that "pathologist
requirement has 'no significant impact' ").
Even now lower courts remain divided, with some relying primarily on the Roe formula, eg.,
Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452, 458-59 (7th Cir. 1984), prob. juris, noted sub nom. Diamond v.
Charles, 105 S. Ct. 2356 (1985); American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thorn-
burgh, 737 F.2d 283, 291-92 (3d Cir. 1984), juris. postponed, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985), and others
attempting to follow the more complex refinements of the Court's 1983 opinions, eg., Birth Control
Centers, Inc. v. Reizen, 743 F.2d 352, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1984).
4. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a Connecticut
law prohibiting use of contraceptives by married couples).
5. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding unconstitutional, as a denial of equal
protection, a Massachusetts law barring distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons).
6. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (holding unconstitutional New
York criminal statutes restricting access to contraceptives).
7. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
8. Carey, 431 U.S. at 689.
9. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
10. In Roe, the Court expressly disclaimed reliance on the Lochner era's practice of using the
due process clause to invalidate any social or economic legislation with which a majority of the
Justices disagreed. Id. at 117 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)). The disclaimer persuaded neither Justice Rehnquist, 410 U.S. at 174, nor the commen-
tators, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973);
Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. Cr. REv. 159.
The Roe majority, like that in Griswold before it, moreover, placed considerable weight on prece-
dents that contained language about the "privacy" of decisions within the family, but in fact struck
down as violations of due process statutes interfering with the economic interests of teachers and
private schools. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923). In other words, the Court relied on precedents that resembled Lochner more closely
than the Court acknowledged. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
1 . The Court has observed that modern constitutional privacy protects two different interests:
that "in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and [that] in independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). The first of these interests
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belong to the individual seeking to exercise reproductive freedom-for
example, the person seeking to use contraceptives or the pregnant wo-
man seeking an abortion. That would certainly be the most plausible
conclusion to draw from either earlier line of cases, tort or substantive
mirrors the tort principle posited by Warren and Brandeis in 1890, see supra note 1, and elevated to
constitutional status under the fourth amendment. See, eg., United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296,
3303 (1984) (warrantless monitoring by beeper of private residence in area not accessible to visual
surveillance violates fourth amendment rights of those having justifiable interest in privacy of resi-
dence); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Constitution
protects "right to be let alone" now threatened by wiretapping and other technological advances).
The second privacy interest is the heart of Roe and other cases affording constitutional protection to
an individual's right to reproductive self-determination.
The precise point at which "privacy" acquired its second meaning remains unclear. Arguably,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which held a married couple's use of contraceptives
falls within a zone of privacy created by the penumbras of several constitutional amendments, marks
the turning point. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 589, 599-600 nn.25-26 (citing Griswold in support of both
privacy interests). Yet a closer reading of Griswold suggests that the majority cared more about
inaccessibility or nondisclosure than about freedom. The opinion not only voiced special concern
about law enforcement efforts that would invade the marital bedroom, but also conceded that a
prohibition on the manufacture or sale of contraceptives would present a different set of legal ques-
tions. 381 U.S. at 485. See Ely, supra note 10, at 930; The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 103, 162 (1965). The opinions of the concurring Justices provide much stronger support for
the conclusion that Griswold introduced the second meaning of "privacy." These five Justices would
have invoked the due process clause to strike down the Connecticut law as an unconstitutional
deprivation of liberty. See 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring, joined by Warren, C.J., and
Brennan, J.); id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 502 (White, J., concurring). White's opinion,
for example, discussed at length cases affording protection to other family-centered decisions. Id. at
502-03.
Alternatively, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), may be the transitional case in the devel-
opment of constitutional privacy. Although the Court eschewed deciding whether the Constitution
affords a right of access to contraceptives and relied on the equal protection clause to invalidate a
ban on the distribution of such products to unmarried persons, its dicta left no ambiguity about the
new meaning of privacy: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453. The Court took
that notion one step further in Roe.
Commentators, including some of the Justices, have noted the double meaning of "privacy." E.g.,
Roe, 410 U.S. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 509-10 & n.1 (Black, J.,
dissenting). See, eg., Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 664 (1980);
Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV.
1447, 1448 (1976). Whatever notion of "privacy" Griswold may have encompassed when it was
written, hindsight has established it as a case about reproductive decision-making. See Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) ("read in light of its progeny, the teaching of
Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjus-
tified intrusion by the State"); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 217 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("We held in Griswold that the States may not preclude spouses from attempting to avoid the joinder
of sperm and egg.").
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due process. 2 And it would be the most plausible conclusion to draw
from the Court's recognition of both the extreme burden imposed upon
women by abortion prohibitions 3 and the unsuitability for legislative res-
olution of an intimate matter of conscience such as abortion.14 Although
reaching generally sound results in striking down abortion restrictions,
the Supreme Court has used an unnecessarily problematic route, how-
ever. On close analysis the Court's opinions, mirroring the entire history
of the law's treatment of reproductive control, reveal that the real focus
has been not the individual patient, but the physician and current stan-
dards of medical practice. 5
This Article examines the role of the physician and current medical
practice in the changing legal status of abortion restrictions. In doing so,
this Article considers "constitutional privacy" from a perspective differ-
ent from other inquiries, which almost always emphasize the individual
patient as the right-holder, and concludes that, at least in the abortion
context, the Court's vision of privacy consistently makes the doctor, not
his patient, the centerpiece of the analysis.16
The Court's early abortion opinions used language explicitly recogniz-
ing the physician's authority over all aspects of a woman's abortion
choice. 7 Although the Court's most recent opinions have abandoned
12. One could plausibly draw this conclusion from the fourth amendment cases as well. See
supra note 11.
13. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
14. See id at 159, 162.
15. Although not all physicians are male, I shall refer to them by masculine pronouns. Abor-
tion and obstetric patients are all female, and to the extent this Article considers other patients who
may be of either gender, I shall use female pronouns to refer to them.
16. Other physician-focused analyses include Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in
Abortion and Sterilization Decisions. The Use and Abuse of Medical Discretion, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 51 (1983); Marcin & Marcin, The Physician's Decision-Making Role in Abortion Cases; 35 THE
JURIST 66 (1975); Wood & Durham, Counseling, Consulting and Consent: Abortion and the Doctor-
Patient Relationship, 1978 B.Y.U.L. Rnv. 783. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 70, 78-79, 84-85 (1983). See also Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.L. Rav. 375, 382 (1985) (criticizing Roe for, inter alia, its "medical
approach"). But see Kapp, Abortion and Informed Consent Requirements, 144 AM. J. OBSTET.
GYNECOL. 1 (1982) (arguing modern debates have ignored the physician). I found Asaro's piece
particularly interesting because it relies on many of the same sources that I considered and it reaches
many of the same conclusions that I reached. Yet our analyses contain substantial differences, for
example, our treatment of the abortion-funding cases, compare infra notes 152-67 and accompanying
text with Asaro, supra, at 88-93, and some of our observations on informed consent, compare infra
notes 195-303 and accompanying text with Asaro, supra, at 76-88. Our articles, therefore, may be
profitably studied together.
17. See infra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
188 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
that language in favor of a more woman-centered rhetoric"8 and have
reached results that offer great practical benefits to women because these
results legitimize the realities of modem abortion-clinic practice,19 the
analysis in these newest opinions reflects the increasing importance of
questions of medical standards and physicians' prerogatives.20
The limited right of reproductive choice that has accrued to the patient
through the Court's recurring solicitude for the physician is incompatible
with the theoretical foundation of this right, "privacy."21 This solicitude
for the physician and his profession, moreover, has committed the Court
to a method of analysis in which it must articulate fine distinctions about
the appropriate way to practice medicine 22-distinctions that often bury
the larger social issue and the interests at stake for abortion patients. As
a result of this approach, the cases have failed to resolve satisfactorily the
possible tension between the abortion patient's rights and her doctor's
autonomy, a tension that emerges most prominently in assessments of
abortion restrictions defining informed consent.21
Alternative ways to address questions of reproductive control, such as
Sylvia Law's argument that abortion restrictions create unconstitutional
gender-based discrimination24 or Donald Regan's thesis that such laws
unconstitutionally single out pregnant women as unwilling good samari-
tans conscripted to endure life- and health-threatening physical bur-
dens,25 help elevate the individual woman's status in the constitutional
analysis and avoid the doctrinal weaknesses in the Court's current meth-
18. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 421 n.1 ("a woman has a fundamental right"), 427 ("the full vindi-
cation of the woman's fundamental right necessarily requires that her physician be given 'the room
he needs to make his best medical judgment' ").
19. See, eg., id at 446-49 (invalidating physician-counseling requirement), 449-51 (invalidating
mandatory waiting period).
20. See, eg., infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
21. This incompatibility follows regardless of the particular meaning of privacy used. See supra
note 11 and text accompanying note 12.
22. See infra notes 89 & 90 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 168-303 and accompanying text.
24. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984). See Brief Amici
Curiae for Committee for Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization Abuse, Simopoulos v. Virginia,
462 U.S. 506 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (brief submitted by Sylvia A.
Law, Nadine Taub and Ellen J. Winner challenging abortion restrictions as unconstitutional sex-
based discrimination). See also Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 382 (attributing widespread criticism of
Roe to Court's focus on "woman tied to her physician" instead of on woman alone).
25. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1569 (1979).
[Vol. 63:183
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odology.2 6 Such women-focused approaches provide a firmer constitu-
tional foundation for reproductive freedom than the present medicine-
based formula, avoid the difficult and unnecessary problems created by
this formula, and yield sound solutions to even the most troublesome
questions raised in abortion litigation.27 Issues presented by the most
recent abortion cases scheduled for the Supreme Court's docket, Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists28 and Dia-
mond v. Charles,29 including the constitutionality of certain specific
"informed consent" requirements,30 provide a timely and useful context
for contrasting these different approaches.31
I. AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL ABORTION RESTRICTIONS
In one sense, the dominance in modem abortion law of the physician
and whatever constitutes "accepted medical practice"3 2 should evoke lit-
tle surprise. A similar pattern emerges from the earliest legal treatment
of the subject-the thirteenth-century English common law's punish-
ment only of those who performed abortions after the fetus had quick-
ened.33 Like its English antecedents, the initial American approach, first
common law and later statutory, punished the abortionist, but not his
patient, and then only for postquickening abortions.34 Several early anti-
abortion restrictions singled out particular methods, for example, poison-
26. See supra notes 10 & 11.
27. See infra notes 304-80 and accompanying text.
28. 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985). The Court postponed "[flurther consideration of the question of
jurisdiction" until the hearing on the merits. Pennsylvania appealed the ruling below, reported at
737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984), which struck down numerous provisions of that state's Abortion Con-
trol Act.
29. 105 S. Ct. 2356 (1985). The Court noted probable jurisdiction. The opinions below, invali-
dating several Illinois abortion restrictions, appear as Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984),
and Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980). Although Supreme Court review was sought on
behalf of the state, current reports indicate that the Attorney General's office had decided not to
pursue the case. Lauter, Was the Court Bamboozled?, Nat'l Law J., June 10, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
"IT]he effect, if any, of the misrepresentation [on the Court's decision to note probable jurisdiction]
cannot be assessed." Id. at 40, col. 1.
30. See Charles, 749 F.2d at 461-62; Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 295-96, 298.
31. See infra notes 304-87 and accompanying text.
32. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 431
(1983).
33. H. DE BRACTON, 2 ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 341 (S.E. Thorne trans.
1968).
34. See Appleton, Abortion in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 2 (1983). These limi-
tations prevailed until New York enacted a substantially stricter law in 1845. 1845 N.Y. LAWS ch.
260, amended by 1846 N.Y. LAWS ch. 22 (repealed).
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ing.35 Such narrow coverage and the traditional inculpation of only the
abortionist (the historical counterpart of the physician in the modem
analysis) 36 have led scholars to conclude that the law sought to protect
the patient from the hazards of certain abortifacients rather than to
criminalize abortion itself.37 In essence, early abortion restrictions, both
common-law and statutory, were early efforts to regulate the practice of
medicine.38
Similarly, the quickening rule, differentiating permissible from illegal
abortions,39 also reflects how the law of abortion took its shape from
medical practices of the time. According to historian James C. Mohr,
quickening-the time when the pregnant woman first feels fetal move-
ments4-owed its legal importance to the unavailability of any accurate
pregnancy test.41 Without such tests only fetal movements could confirm
the fact of pregnancy; before such movements, terminating an early preg-
nancy was indistinguishable from treating a "menstrual obstruction. '42
In other words, only after quickening was it clear that the practitioner
had performed an abortion and not some other medical procedure. The
quickening criterion also served an important evidentiary function, pro-
viding the only indication that the abortion procedure had in fact caused
destruction of a live fetus rather than the expulsion of a fetus that had
35. Eg., CONN. PUB. STATS. tit. 22, § 14 (1821) (repealed).
36. I mean not to equate the skill and qualifications of modem physicians with yesterday's
"irregular" practitioners, see J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900, at 33-45 (1978), but rather to emphasize the distinction between
whoever it is that performs the abortion procedure and the pregnant woman or patient.
37. See, eg., Means, The Phoenix ofAbortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment
Right about to Arise from the Nineteenth Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Com.
mon-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971); Means, The Law ofNew York Concerning Abortion and
the Status ofthe Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411 (1968).
38. See J. MOHR, supra note 36, at 22-24; Appleton, supra note 34, at 2.
39. This distinction persisted in many jurisdictions until the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. See J. MOHR, supra note 36, at 200; Appleton, supra note 34, at 3. Even later, some states
imposed higher penalties for postquickening abortions than for earlier terminations. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 230.3 commentary at 440-41 (1980).
40. This subjective and variable experience usually occurs when the woman has reached be-
tween 16 and 18 weeks of pregnancy.
41. J. MOHR, supra note 36, at 4. For a fascinating review of early (and unreliable) pregnancy
tests, see Forbes, Early Pregnancy and Fertility Tests, 30 YALE J. OF BIOLOGY & MED. 16 (1957).
For a description of early twentieth-century laboratory tests for pregnancy, see J. B. DELEE, PRIN-
CIPLES AND PRACTICE OF OBSTETRICS 277-78 (6th ed. 1933) (describing urine test, reported by
Zondek and Aschheim in 1928); J.B. DELEE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF OBSTETRICS 260-61
(2d ed. 1915) (describing Abderhalden's blood test); J.W. WILLIAMS, OBSTETRIcs 202-03 (4th ed.
1920) (describing Abderhalden's blood test, reported in 1912).
42. J. MOHR, supra note 36, at 4.
[Vol. 63:183
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previously died in utero.4 3
Later, the medical community's increased understanding of the gesta-
tional process, together with the desire of doctors both to improve the
standards of their profession and to eliminate "irregular" practitioners'
from their ranks, spawned a "physicians' crusade"45 to tighten abortion
restrictions.46 The resulting state legislation barred abortion at all stages
of pregnancy unless the procedure was necessary to save the mother's
life.47 In many jurisdictions, prohibitions of this sort endured until the
United States Supreme Court found them unconstitutional in 1973;48
their life attests to the powerful and lasting influence of the nineteenth
century "physicians' crusade."'49 On the other hand, medical opinion
favoring decriminalization played a considerable role in those states that
had modernized their laws before 1973.50
That the limits of medical technology have dictated the limits of the
law is hardly more than a truism. As a practical matter, enforceable
abortion restrictions cannot rest on a technology that does not yet exist.51
43. See Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORD. L. REv. 807,
815-16 (1973). Today, modem pregnancy-monitoring techniques such as ultrasound imaging make
obsolete reliance on quickening for this evidentiary purpose. See, eg., Hubbard, Legal and Policy
Implications of Recent Advances in Prenatal Diagnosis and Fetal Therapy, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. RPT'R.
201, 208 (1982). To the extent that quickening roughly divides pregnancy into two stages, its legal
importance may also have served to allow early (and thus relatively safe) abortions while criminaliz-
ing late (and thus comparatively more hazardous) terminations. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
151-52 (1973).
44. See, eg., J. MOHR, supra note note 36, at 160-63.
45. Id. at 147.
46. Id. at 147-70.
47. See Appleton, supra note 34, at 3. See generally J. MOHR, supra note 36, at 200-45.
48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
49. J. MOHR, supra note 36, at 147.
50. See, e.g., P. STEINHOFF & M. DIAMOND, ABORTION POLITICS 9-10, 16,46-47,73-75, 91-93
(1977) (documenting influence of physicians in abortion law reform in Hawaii). See also Roe, 410
U.S. at 142-44. In addition, to the extent that judicial decree has precipitated law reform, physicians
have appeared as plaintiffs in many important constitutional challenges. E.g., Planned Parenthood
of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973).
51. A legislature hostile to abortion logically could prohibit all procedures that might cause
abortion, even in the absence of any scientific basis for distinguishing pregnancy from a "menstrual
obstruction." See supra note 42 and accompanying text. In fact, laws that prohibited "attempted
abortions" sought to do that, but these laws ultimately proved ineffective because of proof problems
resulting from the nonexistence of a reliable pregnancy test. See Appleton, supra note 34, at 2-3. In
addition, a flat ban on all procedures that might cause abortion could entail costs (for example,
health risks to those who in fact suffer from "menstrual obstructions") that even an anti-abortion
legislature would have been unwilling to impose.
Of course, a legislature might decide to ban a procedure or technique before it becomes scientifi-
cally feasible. See Note, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering: A Constitutional Assess-
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Likewise, that physicians and their understanding of the underlying bio-
logical processes have influenced state legislatures in this area simply re-
affirms the fact that abortion is inevitably a medical procedure, 2 a fact
that has not escaped judicial recognition.53 Yet this unremarkable de-
pendence of law upon medical science differs significantly from their cur-
rent relationship, fashioned by the Supreme Court, in which "standard
medical practice" not only influences law but dictates its constitutional
outer limits. Because the Court has invited states to offer medical justifi-
cations for their abortion restrictions and because the Court has under-
taken to evaluate these justifications under the compelling-state-interest
test,54 a bright constitutional line now separates present medical custom
from nonstandard practice, a line that effectively delegates to the medical
community the responsibility of defining the right to privacy.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CHOOSE ABORTION
A. The Boundaries of the Right: Comparative Safety and Accepted
Medical Practice
Although a number of state legislatures began to relax their abortion
restrictions in the 1960s,"5 the judicial forum ultimately produced the
most sweeping changes. Following several successful constitutional chal-
ment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 476, 492-93 (1974) (noting proposed
legislative bans on human cloning before it becomes possible). Cf. La Pierre, Technology-Forcing
and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1977) (how law can force
technological innovation).
52. Of course, illegal abortion, often by persons not qualified to practice medicine, was long a
prevalent occurrence. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 commentary at 426-27 (1980). A pregnant
woman may also perform "self-abortion," see id., at 436-39, and some advocate continued use of
such self-help techniques even though the present constitutional regime does not protect these prac-
tices. See THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, THE NEW OUR BODIES, OUR-
SELVES 295 (1984) (menstrual extraction to avoid menstrual periods and terminate very early
pregnancies); Barnes, Commentaries: National Medical Trends and Future Implications, in H.F.
OSOFsKY & J.D. OSOFSKY, THE ABORTION EXPERIENCE 530, 533-34 (1973) (envisioning "block
committees" or "neighborhood clubs" where members perform menstrual extraction on each other).
See also Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (privacy right does not encompass abortions by
nonphysicians); Law, supra note 24, at 1020 n.233 (abortion no more medically complex than other
services performed by nonphysicians).
53. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427
(1983); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 699-700 n.25 (1977) (plurality opinion); Roe,
410 U.S. at 166.
54. See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
55. See Comment, A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion: The Contradc-
tions and the Problems, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 177.
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lenges to restrictive abortion laws in state and lower federal courts,5 6 in
1973 the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade" relying in part on the
current positions of the American Medical Association, which no longer
condemned abortion," and the American Public Health Association,
which urged the availability of abortion, subject to certain recommended
standards.59
Roe announced that the right to privacy, now clearly tied to the
"Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions
on state action,"' " encompasses "a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy."61  The Court's framework for analysis re-
quired states to tailor their abortion restrictions narrowly to advance
only compelling governmental interests.6" Within this framework, the
Court observed that, when states first prohibited abortion, they sought to
protect the pregnant woman from the risks associated with the abortion
procedure and not to protect her fetus. 63 The Court determined that
modern medical practice undermined such purported justification. 6a Be-
cause in 1973 the mortality rate from carrying a pregnancy to term ex-
ceeded the mortality rate from early abortion, the Court concluded that
protecting maternal health no longer offered a sufficiently compelling
reason to support abortion restrictions during the first trimester of preg-
nancy.65 After the first trimester, however, when the risks of abortion
increase, the Constitution permits a state to enact reasonable regulations
to safeguard maternal health. 66 Similarly, another state interest, protect-
ing "potential life," becomes compelling only upon viability of the fe-
tus; 67 at this point, which requires an individual medical determination
56. See Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of the Pre-Roe Case Law, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1724
(1979).
57. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
58. Id. at 141-44.
59. Id. at 144-46.
60. Id. at 153.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 155. For subsequent refinements in the standard of review, see supra note 3.
63. 410 U.S. at 148-52, 158.
64. Id. at 149-50.
65. Id. at 163.
66. Id.
67. Id. The Court failed to explain adequately why this interest becomes compelling at viability
and only then. See Ely, supra note 10, at 924-25 (Court mistakes "a definition for a syllogism");
Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of
Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 4 (1973) (same); but see id. at 28 (postviability abortions can be
prohibited because state has no practical way to distinguish them from infanticides).
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in each patient's case,6" the state can prohibit abortion, except when con-
tinued pregnancy endangers maternal life or health.69 In this way, the
Court not only delegated to physicians the task of distinguishing pro-
tected abortions from those within the state's power to outlaw,70 but also
concededly picked a "'compelling' point" 71 inescapably tied to develop-
ments in medical technology.72
Under the Court's approach, which encourages states to advance med-
ical reasons for their antiabortion laws, a woman's constitutional right of
reproductive control owes its scope, if not its very existence, to the state
of the art of contemporary medicine and the safety of its procedures.73
Several cases after Roe have tested and confirmed this hypothesis. For
example, in 1976 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional Missouri's
ban on post-first-trimester abortions performed by saline amniocentesis.74
Whatever the health concerns about this method of abortion,75 the Court
held that a state could not outlaw it until the medical profession had
developed an equally available alternative method.76 In other words, the
68. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387-89, 395-96 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cen-
tral Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63-65 (1976).
69. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
70. The physician's task thus also includes determining when risks to maternal health or life
indicate a postviability abortion. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (reciting broad defini-
tion of "health" to be considered by physician).
71. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
72. See, eg., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 456-
57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("technological improvements will move backward the point of viabil-
ity"); Colautti, 439 U.S. at 387 (point left "flexible for advancements in medical skill"); Ely, supra
note 10, at 924. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 161 (acknowledging possibility of "artificial wombs" in
discussing difficulty of deciding when life begins).
73. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 429 n.11, 437; id. at 453-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see
Rhoden, The New Neonatal Dilemma: Live Births from Late Abortions, 72 GEo. L.J. 1451 (1984).
Rhoden submits that the Court's use of the trimester timetable rested on symbolic and practical
considerations rather than on medical data; the Court wished to adopt a compromise position, ac-
cording different legal status to early and late abortions and avoiding the dilemma of allowing abor-
tions likely to produce live births. Drawing lines at the end of the first trimester and at viability
achieved these goals. The Court has not retreated from this compromise despite technological ad-
vancements. Id. at 1498, 1506.
74. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-79 (1976).
75. The use of saline amniocentesis has decreased with the development of newer methods
offering more effective second-trimester abortions and posing fewer risks to the patient. See
Bygdeman, Prostaglandin Procedures in SECOND TRIMESTER ABORTION 89, 101 (G. Berger, W.
Brenner, & L. Keith eds. 1981); Grimes & Cates, Dilatation and Evacuation in SECOND TRIMESTER
ABORTION, supra, at 119, 128-29. See also Rhoden, supra note 73, at 1501 (discussing safety of
abortion techniques used after first trimester).
76. 428 U.S. at 77-78.
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Constitution requires state legislatures to await additional scientific pro-
gress before imposing such restrictions.
Conversely, in 1983 the Court held that medical progress compels
legal change. A number of jurisdictions had adopted laws, pursuant to
Roe's timetable," requiring hospitalization for all abortions performed
after the first trimester.7" Roe's language seemed to have provided an
ample basis for hospitalization laws; indeed, the Roe Court explicitly
mentioned hospitalization as an example of a permissible health-related
regulation after the first trimester.79 Nonetheless, the Court struck down
such requirements,"0 observing that abortion techniques and their rela-
tive safety had advanced considerably in the decade between 1973 and
1983.81 According to the Court, a new abortion procedure, dilatation and
evacuation or D&E, "is now widely and successfully used for second-
trimester abortions." 2 The Court continued: "[A]n even more signifi-
cant factor is that experience indicates that D&E may be performed
safely on an outpatient basis in appropriate nonhospital facilities."" a The
Court noted the American Public Health Association and the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists no longer recommend hospi-
talization for all second-trimester abortions.8 4 The Court read the Con-
stitution to oblige all state legislatures to follow: "We conclude... that
'present medical knowledge' . . . convincingly undercuts [the] justifica-
tion for requiring that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a
hospital." 5
Under this reasoning, the state interests to which the Court will defer
are coextensive with accepted medical practice, and only those laws con-
forming to this standard will survive judicial scrutiny. The constitutional
right to choose abortion thus ends where this standard ends. Accord-
ingly, the Court upheld a Connecticut law barring nonphysicians from
77. 410 U.S. at 164-66.
78. See, e.g., Akron, 462 U.S. at 431-32; Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 481 (1983); Note, Hospitalization Requirements for Second-Trimester Abor-
tions: For the Purpose of Health or Hindrance?, 71 GEO. L. REv. 991 (1983).
79. 410 U.S. at 163.
80. Akron, 462 U.S. at 438-39; Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 482.
81. Akron, 462 U.S. at 435-37.
82. Id. at 436.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 436-37.
85. Id. at 437. The Court, however, refused to depart from the trimester timetable adopted in
Roe, stating that it "continues to provide a reasonable legal framework for limiting a state's author-
ity to regulate abortions." Id. at 429 n. 11. For Nancy Rhoden's explanation, see supra note 73.
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performing abortions, observing that Roe's safety calculus holds true
only when physicians perform the procedure.8 6 The Court concluded
that "[e]ven during the first trimester... prosecutions for abortions con-
ducted by nonphysicians infringe upon no realm of personal privacy se-
cured by the Constitution against state interference."8 " The Court also
held that Virginia may require physicians to perform all abortions after
the first trimester in licensed clinics and outpatient hospitals because, ac-
cording to the American Public Health Association and the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, such limits are consistent
with accepted medical practice even if full-service hospitalization is
not. 8 Similarly, Missouri may require a pathologist's report following
all abortions because "[a]s a rule it is accepted medical practice to submit
all tissue to the examination of a pathologist."8 9 Four of the nine justices
on the Court disagreed that obtaining a pathology report accords with
accepted medical practice.9 0 Perhaps more significant than resolving this
particular disagreement is recognizing the transformation of the constitu-
tional analysis: judicial evaluations of the appropriate way to practice
medicine have become determinative in deciding questions of individual
privacy.
From 1973 to 1983 the Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on the
boundaries of accepted medical practice and present medical knowledge
to define the boundaries of the right to privacy. The Court's vision of
privacy and its method of analysis make the physician and his profession
ineluctably important. Although standard medical practice is a familiar
legal concept,9" the Court's reliance on this concept is both interesting
and disturbing. It is interesting because the cases could have invoked a
86. Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975).
87. Id. at 11.
88. Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1983).
89. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 487 (1983)
(opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J.; result supported also by O'Connor, White, and Rehn-
quist, JJ.).
90. Id. at 495 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.). As
Justice Blackmun observed, the legislature failed to require that the pathologist perform a micro-
scopic examination of the tissue; under the statute, he must simply perform a gross visual examina-
tion, duplicating the usual responsibility of the attending physician. Id. at 496-97. The statutory
requirement thus adds nothing to the protection of the patient's health. Interview with Michael
Frieman, M.D. and Associate Professor of Clinical Obstetrics and Gynecology, Washington Univer-
sity School of Medicine in St. Louis, MO. (Mar. 4, 1985).
91. Standard medical practice ordinarily defines the physician's duty and determines whether
he breached it in malpractice litigation. See generally W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 187 (5th ed. 1984).
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firmer constitutional ground to recognize and define a woman's right of
reproductive choice.9 2 It is disturbing because the doctor's role in consti-
tutionally protected privacy, according to the Court's early opinions, per-
haps extends well beyond these medical aspects of abortion.
B. The Early Cases: Portraying the Physician as Decision-Maker
Roe v. Wade93 probably best fits with the very limited authority of
courts in a constitutional democracy when Roe is described as a decision
about decision-making.94 Under this reading, the Roe Court did not ex-
press a value judgment favoring abortion, as some critics have con-
tended,95 but rather concluded simply that the Constitution commits
certain highly personal choices to the individual most intimately affected
by them.96 This explanation of Roe's holding or result, with its focus on
the pregnant woman, is both plausible and sensible given the genesis of
the right to privacy.97
Nonetheless, the Court's language in Roe, as distinguished from its
result, portrays the doctor and not the patient as the primary decision-
maker in the abortion context: "[F]or the period of pregnancy prior to
this compelling point [at the end of the first trimester], the attendingphy-
sician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regu-
lation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy
should be terminated."98 Making the same point later in the opinion, the
Court stated: "For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician."99 As
the Court put it, Roe "vindicates the right of the physician to administer
medical treatment according to his professional judgment," subject to the
92. See infra notes 304-87 and accompanying text.
93. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
94. See Tribe, supra note 67.
95. See, e.g., J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES
(1979); Byrn, supra note 43; Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective
Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. Rv. 1250 (1975); Uddo, A Wink from the Bench: The Federal Courts
and Abortion, 53 TUL. L. REV. 398 (1979).
96. See Tribe, supra note 67, at 11. The Court expressly adopted this reading of Roe in Akron.
See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420 n.1 (1983)
("basic principle that a woman has a fundamental right to make the highly personal choice whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy").
97 See supra notes I & 11.
98. 410 U.S. at 163 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
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state's compelling interests."o° "Up to those points, the abortion decision
in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision... ."101
Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton,"°2 in which the Court struck
down Georgia's modem abortion restrictions that allowed some abor-
tions under specified conditions,"0 3 offers a more revealing glimpse of the
Court's initial view of the physician and his constitutional role.
Although it follows from both the nature of the abortion process and the
language of Roe that a woman can exercise her right to terminate a preg-
nancy only to the extent she can find a doctor who will agree to effectuate
her decision, Doe suggests that the Court contemplated the doctor's role
as something more than that of a medical technician who carries out the
abortion choice already reached by the patient. According to Doe, the
physician's "medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all fac-
tors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's
age-relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may re-
late to health. This allows the attending physician the room he needs to
make his best medical judgment."'"
Such considerations necessarily would inject the physician into the
most intimate of details that weigh in the woman's deliberation whether
to terminate her pregnancy. Although Doe encompasses these variables
within the physician's "medical judgment," the Court's list may extend
the physician's inquiry beyond the ordinary limits of that term.10 5 Be-
100. Id. at 165-66. This part of the opinion avoids any express reference to the pregnant woman.
101. Id. at 166. The Court continued by alluding to the remedies available when doctors abuse
their discretion. Id.
102. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
103. Id. at 182. The Georgia statute, based on the Model Penal Code, included special hospitali-
zation, accreditation, committee-approval, two-doctor-concurrence, and residency requirements.
104. Id. at 192.
105. Although for some doctors counseling or allied treatment is central to their practice, e.g.,
psychiatrists, the Court's description of the factors entering a physician's decision whether or not to
perform an abortion seems unjustifiably broad. The description not only invites the physician to
consider matters not ordinarily considered "medical," e.g., whether the physician (not the patient)
feels the patient's family is "large enough" or "too large," but also distorts the role most physicians
feel competent to assume. See infra notes 132 & 133 and accompanying text. In addition, if
"health" is so broadly defined that it is implicated in any choice between abortion and childbirth,
then Roe's statement of the health-based exception to the viability limit, see supra note 69, becomes
meaningless, as do distinctions drawn in other cases between "nontherapeutic" and "medically nec-
essary" abortions. Compare Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) (Connecticut regulation with-
holding funds for "nontherapeutic abortion" is constitutional) with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
317 (1980) (Hyde Amendment, which withholds federal funding for certain "medically necessary
abortions," is constitutional). See Appleton, supra note 3, at 724 n.22, 734 n.97. Moreover, in the
analogous although distinct context of contraception, a plurality of the Court has repudiated the
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sides, when a doctor refuses to effectuate a patient's abortion choice for
reasons other than those considered "medical" under any definition of
that word, state "conscience clauses" approved by the Court protecthim.1o6
In addition, after rejecting the argument that the overview of a hospi-
tal-staff abortion committee would subject a pregnant woman to the
committee's moral disapproval of the sexual activity that resulted in her
predicament, 0 7 the Court in Doe offered this description of the doctor:
The appellants' suggestion is necessarily somewhat degrading to the consci-
entious physician, particularly the obstetrician, whose professional activity
is concerned with the physical and mental welfare, the woes, the emotions,
and the concerns of his female patients. He, perhaps more than anyone
else, is knowledgeable in this area of patient care, and he is aware of human
frailty, so-called "error," and needs. The good physician--despite the pres-
ence of rascals in the medical profession, as in all others, we trust that most
physicians are "good"-will have sympathy and understanding for the
pregnant patient that probably are not exceeded by those who participate in
other areas of professional counseling.' 0 8
Such excerpts led the authors of one early analysis to conclude that the
Supreme Court adopted a model of the doctor as a "medical coun-
selor."' Because "medical considerations alone will rarely dictate the
vision of the physician as a moral counselor. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 699-700
& nn.24-25 (1977). The state cannot constitutionally delegate to physicians a counseling function
regarding decisions in which "no medical judgment is involved at all." Id. at 699 n.24.
106. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955 (Deering Supp. 1985) (prohibiting, inter alia,
employer or other person from requiring physicians or other employees who have filed "moral,
ethical, or religious" objection to abortion to participate directly in such procedures); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38 § 81-33 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (no physician or health care institution shall be
required "against his or its conscience declared in writing to perform, permit or participate in any
abortion"); Mo. REv. STAT. § 197.032 (1978) (no physician or institution shall be required to treat
any woman for abortion contrary to his or its "established policy [or] moral, ethical or religious
beliefs"); see 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (1982) (protection in federally funded family planning programs
of "religious beliefs or moral convictions" of individuals and entities opposing abortion). See also
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-55-3 (Supp. 1984) (prohibiting action for wrongful life: "The fail-
ure or the refusal of any person to prevent the live birth of a person may not be considered in
awarding damages or in imposing a penalty in any action.").
The Court implicitly approved such conscience clauses in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-98
(1973). when it cited Georgia's statute without disapproval, and in Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519
(1977), when it upheld a city-operated hospital's antiabortion policy, based in part on a staffing
practice of drawing personnel from a sectarian medical school opposed to abortion.
107. 410 U.S. at 196.
108. Id. at 196-97.
109. See Wood & Durham, supra note 16, at 791-93. Although Wood and Durham express the
hope that the role accorded to the physician will reduce "the terrible toll that is being paid in the
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outcome of the abortion choice,"110 these commentators wrote, the
Court must have intended the patient to consult the physician for assist-
ance in reaching the initial decision whether or not to seek an abortion
for any possible reasons, medical or otherwise.111 In this light, the right
to privacy recognized by the Court would not be a right to "unfettered
self-determination," but rather a right to "rational choice" '112 in which
the physician actively participates through directive counseling.1 13 In
other words, only the professional advice of the physician would allow
the woman to "choose" and to do so rationally regardless of her initial,
uncounseled preference.1 14 The language of Roe may even suggest that
the doctor ought to "choose" whether or not to terminate a pregnancy
on behalf of his patient. 15 From this reading of Roe and Doe it would
follow that the Court took from the state legislature and assigned to the
doctor the responsibility for drawing a line between permissible and im-
permissible abortions. If the Court did so, it gave the doctor authority
over both "medical" and "nonmedical" aspects of the decision.1 16
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Roe and Doe reflects this
understanding.117 He declined to interpret the majority's opinion as au-
thorizing and protecting a woman's decision to abort for any reason at
all, because he believed that the doctor's judgment would serve as the
necessary screening mechanism. Burger wrote:
I do not read the Court's holdings today as having the sweeping conse-
quences attributed to them by the dissenting Justices; the dissenting views
discount the reality that the vast majority of physicians observe the stan-
dards of their profession, and act only on the basis of carefully deliberated
medical judgments relating to life and health. Plainly, the Court today re-
jects any claim that the Constitution requires abortions on demand.1 18
coinage of tiny bodies" and will help "effectuate ... a net savings in fetal life," id. at 845, their article
contains observations useful to analyses that do not appear to share the same goal. See, e.g., The
Supreme Court, supra note 16, at 84 n.48.
110. Wood & Durham, supra note 16, at 791. See Nathanson, Sounding Board: Deeper into
Abortion, 291 N. ENG. J. MED. 1189, 1189 (1974) ("there are seldom any purely medical indications
for abortion"). Of course, the accuracy of this conclusion depends on the meaning ascribed to "med-
ical" and to related terms such as "health." See supra notes 70 & 105.
111. Wood & Durham, supra note 16, at 791.
112. Id. at 789. See id, at 789-93.
113. See Marcin & Marcin, supra note 16, at 73.
114. Wood & Durham, supra note 16, at 792-93.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 98 & 99.
116. See supra notes 105 & 110 and accompanying text.
117. 410 U.S. at 207-08.
118. Id. at 208.
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How accurate or realistic is this vision of the physician as counselor on
matters medical and nonmedical and as ultimate decision-maker? After
Roe and Doe, free-standing abortion clinics proliferated,"1 9 and today,
most abortions are performed in such facilities, 120 where physicians are
employees of the clinic. 2 and usually see each patient only just before
the abortion itself begins.' 22  Patients receive counseling, usually in
-groups, from nonphysicians.' 23 Empirical studies indicate that fewer
than one percent of first-trimester abortion patients visiting clinics are
likely to decide not to terminate their pregnancies; 124 that health officials
of any sort participate in only one quarter of the decisions to abort 25 and
in still fewer decisions to deliver; 126 that most women discuss unwanted
pregnancies with several persons before consulting a physician;127 that
only two-thirds of these women reported full discussions with the physi-
cian to be possible;' 28 that doctors were among the most unsympathetic
119. Telephone interview with Sylvia Hampton, Director of Community Education, Reproduc-
tive Health Services, Inc., St. Louis, Mo. (July 1, 1985).
120. Bracken, Psychosomatic Aspects of Abortion: Implications for Counseling, 19 J. REPRO.
MED. 265, 266 (1977); Sullivan, Tietze & Dryfoos, Legal Abortion in the United States, 1975-1976, 9
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 116, 127 (1977). See THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE,
supra note 52, at 300-01. Ninety percent of all abortions today occur in clinics. Telephone interview
with Janet Benshoof, Director, Reproductive Freedom Project, American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation, New York, N.Y. (July 23, 1985).
121. Telephone interview, supra note 119.
122. See Goldsmith, Early Abortion in a Family Planning Clinic, 6 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 119, 121
(1974). See also Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 n.2 (1976) (Stew-
art, J., concurring) (physician has no contact with minor patient prior to abortion procedure).
123. See THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, supra note 52, at 301; Bracken,
supra note 120, at 266-67; Dornblaser, Pregnancy Termination, The Abortion Decision, MINN. MED.,
Jan. 1981, at 45.
124. Bracken, supra note 120, at 268.
125. Friedlander, Kaul & Stimel, Abortion: Predicting the Complexity of the Decision-Making
Process, 9 WOMEN & HEALTH 43, 48 (1984). But see Bracken, Klerman & Bracken, Abortion, Adop-
tion or Motherhood: An Empirical Study of Decision-Making during Pregnancy, 130 AM. J. OBSTET.
& GYN. 251, 255-56 (1978) (physicians played role in about half the decisions to abort).
126. Bracken, Klerman & Bracken, supra note 125, at 256.
127. Ashton, Patterns of Discussion and Decision-Making among Abortion Patients 12 J. Biosoc.
ScI. 247, 249 (British study charting order and frequency of key discussions). See Bracken, Klerman
& Bracken, supra note 125, at 255-56 (discussion with significant others); Friedlander, Kaul &
Stimel, supra note 125 (64% discuss decision with sexual partner, 25% with health professionals,
5% with counselors, 2% with no one); Lupfer & Silber, How Patients View Mandatory Waiting
Periods for Abortion, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 75, 76 (1981) (88% of abortion patients reported dis-
cussing decision before seeing abortion counselor).
128. Ashton, supra note 127, at 250, 257 (British study finds full discussion with family doctors.
possible in only 66% of cases).
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or unconcerned about the patient's predicament; 129 and that women re-
ported virtually no change of mind following consultation with the doc-
tor.130 The data fail to support the model portrayed by the Court.13'
Perhaps even more revealing is the physician's own view of his role in
the abortion process. One doctor observes that the Roe Court's "phrase
'between a woman and her physician' is an empty one since the physician
is only the instrument of her decision, and has no special knowledge of
the moral dilemma or the ethical agony involved in her decision. "132 An-
other physician agrees, asking "Why the gratuitous addition [by the
Court] of the words 'and her physician'? What, in the last analysis, has
the physician to do with this decision? Since the majority of pregnancy
terminations are for socioeconomic reasons, how can the doctor know
these reasons as acutely as the woman herself?' 33
Lawrence Tribe, who attributes no substantive effect to the "medical
terminology"' 134 in Roe and Doe, speculates that the Court may have "be-
lieved that the public acceptability of its result would be enhanced if it
couched the abortion holding in medical rather than ethical terms.' 35
Yet, contrary to Tribe, the Court's language acknowledges the ethical
aspects of each abortion decision but appears to assign responsibility for
them to the physician and not his patient. 36
Whatever the realities of abortion practice, the reasons behind the
Court's early approach and the constitutional questions raised by a true
delegation of abortion decision-making to the doctor, 1 37 the Court did
not abandon the paradigm described in Roe and Doe 38 until after it had
decided subsidiary issues in a manner reinforcing the view that the doc-
129. Id. at 252, 258.
130. Id. at 255. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
131. See Comment, Justice HanyA. Blackmun: The Abortion Decisions, 34 ARK. L. REV. 276,
288 n.82 (1980).
132. Nathanson, supra note 110, at 1189.
133. Barnes, supra note 52, at 530. Cf Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39
U. Prrr. L. REv. 137, 173 (1977) (in discussing contexts other than abortion, author states that
physicians "see themselves as ultimate decisionmakers").
134. See Tribe, supra note 67, at 38 n.168. But see generally Asaro, supra note 16.
135. Tribe, supra note 67, at 38 n.168. But see Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 382-83 (reaching
opposite conclusion and attributing criticism of Roe to Court's failure to focus on woman alone
rather than on "woman tied to her physician").
136. See supra notes 104 & 105 and accompanying text.
137. Tribe, supra note 67, at 37 (first-amendment violation to give this associational choice to
doctor or some other disinterested expert).
138. Opinions issued a decade after Roe and Doe more accurately reflect the reality of modem
abortion-clinic practice and the physician's de minimus counseling function, see City of Akron v.
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tor's discretion is an intrinsic part of the patient's "privacy" and some-
thing more than an inevitable incident of the medical nature of the
abortion procedure.
For example, in 1976 in Singleton v. Wu/ff13 9 the Court held that doc-
tors had standing to assert the privacy interests of their patients in a
constitutional challenge to legislative restrictions on the public funding of
abortions."4 Although other cases, both earlier and later, allowed physi-
cians to challenge abortion restrictions not only as potential criminal de-
fendants implicated by the violation of such laws but also as the
guardians of their patients' interests,1 41 the restrictions attacked in Sin-
gleton differed significantly. They did not criminalize the performance of
abortions and thus did not directly threaten physicians; doctors remained
free to perform abortions though without state reimbursement for those
rendered to indigent patients.142 The Justices explicitly refused to decide
whether doctors have a constitutionally protected right to practice
medicine.143 Instead, they permitted the doctors to challenge the fund-
ing restrictions on behalf of their patients because the patient's right is
"inextricably bound up with the activity the [physician] wishes to pur-
sue" 1  and because the doctor is "fully, or very nearly, as effective a
proponent of the [patient's privacy] right as the [patient herself]. ' 45
Giving physicians standing to challenge both criminal and noncrimi-
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), but without resolving the analytic
difficulties produced by the earlier approach. See infra notes 232-303 and accompanying text.
139. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
140. Id. at 118 (plurality opinion); see ia at 121-22 (opinion ofStevens, J., concurring in result).
But see Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional Jus Tertif" A Substantive Approach, 70 CALIF. L. Rnv.
1308, 1332 (1982) (physicians in Singleton could have asserted their own equal protection rights).
141. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 440
n.30 (1983); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973). See also, e-g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 443-46 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives has standing to raise constitutional rights of unmar-
tied persons denied access by prohibition against distribution); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 481 (1964) (those who gave medical advice to married couples about contraception "have stand-
ing to raise the constitutional rights of the married people with whom they had a professional rela-
tionship"). But see Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 n.2 (1976)
(physicians have no standing to challenge statute imposing state wardship on infant born alive fol-
lowing abortion).
142. See 428 U.S. at 113 (challenged statute imposes "concrete injury" on physicians who allege
that they have performed and will continue to perform otherwise reimbursable abortions; if physi-
cians prevail, "they will benefit, for they will then receive payment for the abortions").
143. Id. (plurality opinion). Cf Kapp, supra note 16, at 3 (advocating protection of physician's
own rights in abortion litigation).
144. 428 U.S. at 114 (plurality opinion).
145. Id. at 115 (plurality opinion).
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nal abortion restrictions assists women who seek to assert privacy claims
by providing them with a vehicle that protects their anonymity.146 Yet
Singleton reached this useful result by treating the doctor and patient as
one, with coextensive interests at stake.147 Under Roe and Doe, these
interests encompass not only the aspects of abortion that are ordinarily
considered medical, but also the "familial," moral, personal, and social
dimensions of the choice as well. "I Although a physician has strong and
important interests in administering medical care free from arbitrary
state restrictions, 149 common sense dictates that these interests differ
qualitatively from the interests of a woman seeking to determine her own
reproductive destiny. 5  Her claim, moreover, rests on more substantial
constitutional roots than his.' 5' Singleton's fusion of physician and pa-
tient blurs these lines.
Although the Court's deference to accepted professional standards'52
and to the physician's expansive decision-making authority has protected
the abortion right from unfavorable legislation,' 53 this deference may
also shed some light on the one string of opinions in which the Court has
uniformly upheld laws hostile to abortion. In the trilogy of abortion-
146. See id. at 117 (plurality opinion). The Justices also considered the technically "imminent
mootness ... of any individual woman's claim." Id. (plurality opinion). But see id. at 126 (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Roe v. Wade allowed women to use pseudonyms and to
avoid mootness of claims).
147. See 428 U.S. at 128 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I do not read
these cases as merging the physician and his patient for constitutional purposes.").
148. See supra notes 104, 105 & 110 and accompanying text.
149. The Court found constitutional protection for some of these interests in its old substantive-
due-process doctrine. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); supra note 10. But see
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 n.21 (1980) (rejecting argument that selective funding violates
due process rights of physicians).
150. See infra notes 304-80 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 11 & 12 and accompanying text.
152. See supra at notes 64-90 and accompanying text.
153. With the exception of regulations of minors' abortion rights, see, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding parental notification requirement); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979) (state may require parental or judicial consent substitutes for immature minors, so long as
these minors receive permission for abortions in their best interests), few abortion restrictions have
survived constitutional scrutiny. See, eg., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking down hospitalization, informed-consent and waiting-period re-
quirements); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down
spousal and parental consent requirements and ban on saline amniocentesis). But see Simopoulos v.
Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983) (upholding requirement that physicians perform abortions after first
trimester in clinics); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476
(1983) (upholding mandatory pathology report and requirement of second physician at postviability
abortions).
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funding cases decided in 1977' and the pair that followed in 1980,155 a
majority of the Justices held that the government had not infringed any
protected privacy right by subsidizing childbirth but not abortion, even
though such selective funding might totally foreclose some indigent wo-
men from obtaining both therapeutic and elective abortions.156
Although I have attempted previously to explain how these decisions
might be harmonized with Roe v. Wade and its descendants because se-
lective funding does not "impinge" on the woman's constitutional right
recognized in those cases,' 5 7 it may also be no coincidence that public
funding allocations do not "entangle"' 58 the state in second-guessing pre-
vailing professional standards or overseeing the exercise of medical judg-
ment.' 59 However questionable the majority's conclusion that "[a]n
indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a
consequence of [the government's] decision to fund [only] childbirth,"'6
one can argue much more cogently that the funding restrictions do not
limit the physician's freedom to counsel and perform abortions in ways
consistent with current practice. Despite these restrictions, the physi-
cian's options and decision-making authority-including whether or not
to see an abortion patient free of charge-remain his own. 161 Funding
154. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519 (1977).
155. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Zbaraz v. Williams, 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
156. Although the scope of the restriction on a St. Louis public hospital was ambiguous, see
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 520 (1977); Appleton, supra note 3, at 731 n.80, the 1977 cases stand
for the proposition that neither the Social Security Act nor the Constitution compels the government
to fund abortions that are not medically necessary. The Court reached the same constitutional con-
clusion in 1980 regarding medically necessary abortions. See i at 731.
157. See generally Appleton, supra note 3. But see Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly
Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae 32 STAN. L. REv.
1113 (1980).
158. This term, borrowed from establishment clause jurisprudence, see, eg., Lemon v. Kurzman,
403 U.S. 602, 613-20 (1971), aptly reflects one of the Court's chief reasons for keeping the state out
of the doctor's domain and for good reason: when legislatures enter that domain, "they don't always
know what they are doing." Interview, supra note 90.
Cf Tribe, note 67, at 32 ("first-amendment concern for religious-political disentanglement" pro-
vides model for making previability abortion a personal, not a governmental, question).
159. See supra notes 105 & 110 (examining broad and narrow definitions of "medical" and
"health").
160. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977)) (emphasis added). Judge Ginsburg suggests that the Court would have recognized the un-
fairness (and unconstitutionality) of funding restrictions if it had "acknowledged a woman's equality
aspect, not simply a patient-physician autonomy constitutional dimension to the abortion issue."
Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 385.
161. This would certainly be true of physicians in private practice. Even in free-standing clinics,
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restrictions may affect physicians as "businessmen," but not physicians
as embodiments of the medical ideal embraced by the Court. 62 In this
setting, the indigent pregnant woman's exercise of choice depends en-
tirely on the nonmedical decision 163 of her possibly uncharitable doctor.
The doctor's power to reject a woman's abortion choice on financial
grounds resembles the third-party consent requirements that the Court
has condemned as "possibly arbitrary" 164 vetoes of the abortion right. 165
In other words, in the funding cases the Court upheld antiabortion
laws that foreclosed some women's reproductive choices but did not
compromise a physician's exercise of medical judgment or decision-mak-
ing authority.1 66 This result confirms the conclusion emerging from the
cases in which the Court has accorded more protection to the abortion
where physicians are employees, physicians retain discretion to reduce or eliminate their fees for
women unable to pay the full price of an abortion. Telephone interview with Sylvia Hampton,
Director of Community Education, Reproductive Health Services, Inc. (a not-for-profit, tax-exempt
corporation), St. Louis, Mo. (July 1, 1985).
If these cases constrain a physician's discretion at all, that result is attributable to the relatively
little-noted opinion in Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977), upholding St. Louis' ban on abortions at
a city hospital. A physician may be unable to effectuate his medical judgment if the necessary facili-
ties are off-limits. Cf id at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Public hospitals that do not permit the
performance of elective abortions will frequently have physicians on their staffs who would willingly
perform them."). The majority never addressed this issue but noted instead that individuals drawn
from "a Jesuit-operated institution opposed to abortion" staffed the clinic at the hospital in question
under a longstanding practice. Id at 520. See Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 667 F.2d 754 (8th Cir.
1982) (city may not prohibit physicians from performing abortions on paying patients at commu-
nity's only hospital), appeal dismissed, cert denied, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983). Cf McCabe v. Nassau
County Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1971) (physicians' refusal to sterilize patient at
public hospital "was based not on medical factors peculiar to her case but on an arbitrary age-parity
formula").
162. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. The unavailability of public funds for a specific
kind of medical treatment or practice may well dissuade physicians from entering a particular speci-
ality at all or from continuing one already entered. The physician makes a business choice, which
may significantly diminish the opportunities for a patient to effectuate her right to privacy.
163. The Court has observed that the indigent woman "continues as before to be dependent on
private sources for the services she desires." Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
164. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
165. See id at 67-75 (holding unconstitutional spousal and parental consent requirements for
abortion).
166. The Court in Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976), found that physicians suffered
"concrete injury" from abortion-funding restrictions. Robert Sedler concluded that physicians could
have challenged such restrictions as violations of their own equal protection rights to payment. Sed-
ler, supra note 140, at 1332. In a footnote to Harris v. McRae, the Court rejected a claim that
funding restrictions "violate the due process rights of the physician who advises a Medicaid recipient
to obtain a medically necessary abortion." 448 U.S. at 318 n.21. Nevertheless, none of the funding
restrictions in either Singleton or McRae purported to tell the doctor how to exercise his (even
broadly defined) medical discretion. He may refuse to see indigent patients for financial reasons and,
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choice: the Court has repeatedly shown as much solicitude for the physi-
cian's prerogatives as for the patient's interests-and in some respects
even more. 167
C. Later Problems: Clinic Practice, Medical Discretion and the
"Truly Informed" Abortion Patient
Nowhere did the tension invited by the Court's joinder of the doctor
and the patient and its attachment to an idealized vision of the doctor as
abortion counselor and decision-maker surface as prominently as in chal-
lenges to abortion restrictions enacted by many states purportedly to en-
sure the patient's "truly informed consent."
' 161
The doctrine of informed consent to medical treatment evolved in tort
law from a patient's protection against assault and battery. 169 It matured
into a right of self-determination for patients that requires disclosure of
whatever is necessary for the patient to make an intelligent choice about
whether to undergo any particular treatment,1 71 including the risks of
proposed treatment as well as the alternatives and their hazards. 7 1 To-
if he should decide to see some patients without compensation, he remains free to exercise his medi-
cal judgment regarding abortion.
167. Asaro, supra note 16, refers to the Court's treatment of the funding cases as the "judicial
abandonment of medical discretion." Id. at 88. I disagree. As elaborated in the text, funding re-
strictions leave the physician free to exercise his medical discretion while disadvantaging the patient
whose abortion option is often left to the mercy of the physician's financial (and thus nonmedical)
judgment. The patient's privacy right is diminished; the physician's discretion is not.
168. See, eg., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 442-
49 (1983); Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1013-22 (Ist Cir. 1981);
Womens Servs., P.C. v. Thone, 636 F.2d 206, 210 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 452 U.S.
911 (1981); Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 722, 779-86 (7th Cir. 1980), supplemented sub nom. Charles
v. Daley, 749 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1984), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Diamond v. Charles, 105 S. Ct.
2356 (1985).
169. A useful summary of the evolution of the doctrine of informed consent, including analyses
of the principal cases, appears in Katz, supra note 133, at 143-64. See Meisel, The "Exceptions" to
the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance between the Competing Values in Medical Deci-
sionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 413 [hereinafter "Exceptions']; Meisel, The Expansion of Liability
for Medical Accident" From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L.
REv. 51 (1977) [hereinafter Expansion].
170. See Katz, supra note 133, at 149-54 (examining Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr., Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan.
393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960)). See also Note, Informed Consent: From Disclosure to Patient Participa-
non in Medical Decisionmaking, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 172 (1981) (urging additional duties for physi-
cians to enhance patient choice).
171. See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-81, 787-88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972);
Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 157-58, 223 A.2d 663, 670 (1966). See also Truman v. Thomas, 27
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day, violations of the patient's right of informed consent are a form of
negligent malpractice, compensable in damages. 72 Although jurisdic-
tions vary regarding the standard of care 7 3 and recognize several excep-
tions to the rule that relieve the physician of the duty of disclosing
information waived by the patient,' 74 information within the average pa-
tient's common knowledge,' or information harmful to the patient (the
so-called therapeutic privilege),' 76 the essence of the modem doctrine is
that an uninformed patient who authorizes a particular treatment has not
really consented to it.'77 The law of torts purports to view 178 the disclo-
sure of information about a contemplated medical procedure as critical
to the exercise of a patient's right to meaningful choice.
"Informed consent" became a constitutional issue in 1976 when the
Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980) (physician's disclosure duty includes statement
of risks of foregoing diagnostic procedure).
172. See, eg., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 239-41, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 511-12
(1972); Katz, supra note 133, at 150-64. Cf id. at 165 (theorizing that shift from battery to negli-
gence masks law's preference for doctors' paternalism over patients' self-determination).
173. Compare Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 409, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960) (physician has
duty to make "those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the
same or similar circumstances") with Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784-87 (D.C. Cir.) (stan-
dard set by law, not by physicians; standard focuses on risks material to "reasonable person, in what
physician knows or should know to be the patient's position"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)
and Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558-59 (Okla. 1979) (court rejects Canterbury's "reasonable
patient" standard; patient's right of self-determination requires resolving whether the patient would
not have consented to the treatment if he had been informed of the risks). See generally Katz, supra
note 133, at 154-60.
174. See, eg., Meisel, "Exceptions" supra note 169, at 453-60.
175. See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 788; Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic
Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 415 (1974); Meisel, Expansion, supra note
169, at 89-90.
176. See Katz, supra note 133, at 155-58, 168; Meisel, "Exceptions", supra note 169, at 433. See
also . CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE 102-23 (1982) (dis-
cussing narrow justifications for active paternalism in health care); Andrews, Informed Consent Stat-
utes and the Decisionmaking Process, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 163, 215 (1984) ("Legislative elimination of
the therapeutic privilege would more consistently reflect the patient's right of self-determination.");
Meisel, "Exceptions'" supra note 169, at 467-69 (suggesting abolition of therapeutic privilege because
of threat to patient's right to self-determination); Comment, Informed Consent: The Illusion of
Patient Choice, 23 EMORY L.. 503 (1974) (advocating restrictions on therapeutic privilege).
177. Meisel, "Exceptions" supra note 169, at 420-22; Note, The Abortion Alternative and the
Patient's Right to Know, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 167, 175. Disclosure to the patient also may offer
therapeutic benefits and improve the physician's decision-making. Andrews, supra note 176, at 165-
71.
178. Jay Katz, however, calls a "fairy tale" the belief that informed consent protects the pa-
tient's right to self-determination because even this legal doctrine defers to physicians as the ultimate
decision-makers. See generally Katz, supra note 133. See also Meisel, "Exceptions"; supra note 169,
at 413 n.2 (citing medical authorities positing fiction and absurdity of informed consent).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss2/2
PHYSICIAN'S ROLE IN "PRIVATE" DECISIONS
Supreme Court upheld in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth1 9 a Missouri law imposing criminal liability on any physician
who failed to obtain his patient's written consent to abortion. 180 The
Court rejected the argument that Roe prohibited any such "extra layer
and burden of regulation on the abortion decision" beyond those im-
posed on other medical procedures.18' It reasoned:
The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and
it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its
nature and consequences. The woman is the one primarily concerned, and
her awareness of the decision and its significance may be assured, constitu-
tionally, by the State to the extent of requiring her prior written consent. 182
Yet a footnote hinted that the infringement of the doctor's freedom, not
the patient's, might prove a more pressing concern in future cases. The
Court defined "informed consent" as "the giving of information to the
patient as to just what would be done and as to its consequences." '83
The Court added: "To ascribe more meaning than this might well con-
fine the attending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable strait-
jacket in the practice of his profession." ' 4
After Missouri's written-consent law survived constitutional challenge
even though it was an abortion regulation imposed on the first trimester
(the period free from compelling state interests under Roe), 85 a number
of states took "informed consent" a step further. Undoubtedly to dis-
courage abortion,8 6 they enacted criminal laws listing many specific
"facts" that each patient had to receive to be "truly informed." Under
two Akron, Ohio, provisions that typified such legislation and that ulti-
mately reached the Supreme Court, the patient first must be "orally in-
formed by her attending physician"'8 7 of the status of the "unborn
child"' 88 as a "human life from the moment of conception;" 1 89 the
"characteristics of the particular unborn child ... including... appear-
179. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
180. Id. at 65-67. See generally Note, Abortion Regulation: The Circumscription of State Inter-
vention by the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 15 GA. L. REv. 681 (1981).
181. 428 U.S. at 66.
182. Id. at 67.
183 Id. at 67 n.8.
184. Id,
185. See supra notes 65 & 67 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 200, 216 & 233 and accompanying text.
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ance, mobility, tactile sensitivity, including pain;"'," the physical and
psychological hazards of abortion;191 and the availability of agencies to
assist her regarding birth control, continued pregnancy, childbirth, and
adoption. 192 Second, the attending physician must disclose "the particu-
lar risks associated with her own pregnancy and the abortion technique
to be employed [and] other information which in his own medical judg-
ment is relevant to her decision as to whether to have an abortion or
carry her pregnancy to term."'193 Akron imposed as an accompanying
requirement a waiting period of twenty-four hours, said to insure thor-
ough contemplation of the communicated information. 194
The Court's early abortion jurisprudence had portrayed the interests
of the doctor and his patient as entirely compatible, if not identical.' 95
Yet, outside the abortion context, the law of informed consent had devel-
oped, at least in theory, 196 to protect the patient from possible excesses of
the physician.' 97 Because of this inconsistency between doctrines, lower
courts striking down abortion-information statutes like Akron's found
the reasons difficult to articulate.' 9 8 The tort law doctrine would suggest
that the more information the law guarantees the patient, the better able
she should be to decide, in Roe's words, "whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy."' 9 9 Although abortion-information statutes like Akron's ap-
pear patently designed to dissuade any patient contemplating abortion, 200
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 424 n.5.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., id. at 449.
195. See supra notes 93-118 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 178.
197. See generally McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41
MINN. L. Rav. 381 (1957); Note, supra note 170.
198. See, eg., Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1016-22 (1st Cir.
1981); Women's Servs., P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022, 1042-50 (D. Neb. 1979), af'd, 636 F.2d
206 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 452 U.S. 911 (1981). See also infra note 202 (citing
additional cases).
199. 410 U.S. at 153.
200. See, eg., Akron, 462 U.S. 444. Cf Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641
F.2d at 1017 (Roe "protects the outcome of the decision, providing a shield against state require-
ments that attempt to skew the choice one way or another"). In some states the legislation itself
made clear the underlying antiabortion motive. See, e.g., Akron, 462 U.S. at 421 n.2; American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 304 (3d Cir. 1984) (quot-
ing directive for construction of Pennsylvania statute), juri. postponed, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985);
Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1332 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (quoting legislative statement of intent
underlying Illinois statute), aff'd sub. non. Wyn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).
[V9ol. 63:183
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the greater the likelihood that particular information will influence her
decision, the more essential the information arguably becomes for secur-
ing her informed consent.20' When lower courts apparently could not
explain why requiring such information infringed the patient's right, they
referred instead to the physician.21 2 Seizing on the physician's "straight-
jacket" language from Danforth,2 "3 these lower courts held that such
statutes must fall because they unconstitutionally invade the province of
the doctor.2" This approach makes sense if one assumes, as the Supreme
Court has, that the doctor's and the abortion patient's interests are inter-
changeable or are equally entitled to judicial protection.
But if such assumptions beg the question when the question is in-
formed consent, how does the reasoning used by the lower courts address
the interests of the pregnant woman, to whom the constitutional privacy
right must belong?20 5 More specifically, suppose that the physician's
views and the patient's initial preference conflict. The Supreme Court's
early opinions depict the physician as the patient's counselor who directs
her deliberation and reaches the ultimate decision whether to terminate
her pregnancy, in consultation with her;20 6 he can also refuse to partici-
201. See Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d at 1018-19. Cf Canterbury
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.) (therapeutic privilege "does not accept the paternalistic
notion that the physician may remain silent simply because divulgence might prompt the patient to
forego therapy the physician feels the patient really needs"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972);
Meisel, "Exceptions", supra note 169, at 445-46 ("paternalistic to an extreme" to judge patient's
competency by outcome of decision-making process).
202. Eg., Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 210 (E.D. La. 1980); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F.
Supp. 1302, 1317 (N.D. Ill. 1978), affd sub nor. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979). See
Freiman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 440 U.S. 941 (1979).
203. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 202 (citing cases invoking physician's "straitjacket").
205. Some courts that struck down the required communication of medical information none-
theless upheld provisions compelling the transmission of nonmedical information. See, ag., Planned
Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1017, 1020-21 (1st Cir. 1981) (upholding
mandatory consent form that does not require physician personally to read contents to patients,
which describes availability of alternatives to abortion and public assistance); Leigh v. Olson, 497 F.
Supp. 1340, 1346 (D.N.D. 1980) (upholding as "reasonably related to the giving of informed con-
sent" statute requiring physician or counselor to disclose to patient alternatives to abortion, such as
childbirth and adoption, as well as information on economic assistance); Margaret S. v. Edwards,
488 F. Supp. 181, 211-12 (E.D. La. 1980) (upholding as "rationally related to the giving of an
informed consent" statute requiring physician to provide information about available social services
should patient choose childbirth). See also Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. at 1345 n.2 ("[Though Roe]
held that the abortion decision be made in consultation with a physician, it is the woman's right that
is protected. The physician has no fundamental right to perform an abortion or any other medical
procedure.").
206. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
Washington University Open Scholarship
212 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 63:183
pate in any abortion she may want-even if she cannot find another phy-
sician willing to assist her.2 °7 It follows that a physician may on his own
initiative impart to a patient the same information as that included in any
"truly informed consent" statute, even if he intends his statements to
dissuade her from terminating her pregnancy.208 By the same reasoning,
the doctor violates no constitutional right of his patient 2 9 if the informa-
tion that he chooses to convey, whether inadvertently or by design, con-
vinces her to abort despite her initial preference for carrying to term.210
207. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
208. As one lower court pointed out:
The provisions of the [state-required] informed consent form may be said to be material
only to the extent that they differ from the prevailing medical standard of desirable infor-
mation. Insofar as they require only what a physician would do in their absence, they are
on the one hand unnecessary but on the other untroubling. In assessing the statute's bur-
dens and benefits, then, the critical cases are those in which information contained in the
form would not be provided in the exercise of standard medical care.
Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d at 1018 n.16.
A physician who chooses to communicate false or erroneous information to influence the patient's
choice of treatment may be liable to the patient for malpractice, assault and battery, fraud or misrep-
resentation. See, eg., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d 1093, 1103 (1960). Cf Mei-
sel, "Exceptions" supra note 169, at 458 (material misrepresentation makes waiver of informed
consent involuntary). He may be criminally liable as well. See, eg., People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d
574, 578, 414 P.2d 353, 357, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 (1966) (grand theft), on remand, 270 Cal. App.
2d 381, 75 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (second-degree murder), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1021
(1970).
209. When a private physician counsels a patient, no constitutional issue arises because the phy-
sician's conduct is not state action. Even when a physician employed by a government-operated
institution, however, influences a patient's choice of treatment, what constitutional right has he vio-
lated? Even apart from the state-action question, see, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982)
(limits on doctrine), the patient has no constitutional right to avoid hearing particular information.
Moreover, to the extent that the Court has recognized a constitutional right to decide, free from state
interference, "whether or not to terminate her pregnancy," Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, the Court has
expressly held that right to be circumscribed by the physician's exercise of medical judgment, see
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197, 199 (1973). See also McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Center,
453 F.2d 698, 708 (2d Cir. 1971) (Moore, J., dissenting) (woman has no right to be sterilized over
doctor's refusal; physician's judgment must be left "as uncontrolled as possible"). Cf. J. CHILDRESS,
supra note 176, at 115 (patient has no right to particular treatment from particular doctor; hence,
doctor's refusal to acquiesce in treatment he considers ill-advised is not morally unjustified). Finally,
under the abortion-funding cases, see supra notes 154-67 and accompanying text, the right to choose
abortion does not include the positive right to state assistance in that choice. See Appleton, supra
note 3.
210. The physician's disclosure of hazards to the patient, see infra note 229 and accompanying
text (risk of pregnancy generally); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 339 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(special risks of pregnancy to some women), or of her risks of bearing a congenitally anomalous child
may produce this result, see, eg., Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984) (parents and
child with birth defects allege that mother would have obtained abortion but for physician's negli-
gent genetic counseling); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807
(1978) (same). In an'empirical study of single, generally young, black, poor and previously pregnant
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Given the enormous power of the physician to influence the patient's
decision through his transmission or withholding of information 2 1 -a
power necessarily recognized in the doctrine of informed consent-advo-
cates of patient choice favor required disclosure when the contemplated
medical procedure is sterilization. They hope to insure that a patient will
receive all the information necessary to reach a meaningful decision
about sterilization, 2 2 regardless of what the physician may wish her to
hear or to decide.2" 3 Why, then, the resistance to such requirements in
the name of patient freedom2" 4 in the abortion context?215
patients, one in 20 reported some persuasion from physicians to abort. Bracken, Klerman &
Bracken, supra note 125, at 257. But see Law, supra note 24, at 1020 n.233 ("There are virtually no
situations in which a physician would recommend an abortion to a woman who sought to continue
the pregnancy and who was able to cooperate in doing so.").
The physician's role and behavior may vary with his culture. See J. CHILDRESS, supra note 176, at
122 (how doctors in China "persuade" patients to change their minds about treatment in their "best
interest," including abortion); Weisskopf, China's Crusade Against Children, Wash. Post Nat'l
Weekly Ed., Jan. 28, 1985, at 6, col. I ("heart-to-heart chats" by "persuasion groups" in China to
convince pregnant woman who already has a child to undergo abortion).
211. See Schneyer, Informed Consent and the Danger of Bias in the Formation of Medical Disclo-
sure Practices, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 124 (examining reasons for possible bias, eg., physician's eco-
nomic interests, and consequences for doctrine of informed consent); Note, supra note 170, at 175-
76. See also Waltz and Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628, 645-46
(1970) (physician may use salesmanship to persuade patient); Hubbard, supra note 43, at 206 (how
physicians have produced "unnecessary medicalization" of obstetrics).
212. See, eg., Comment, Sterilization Abuse: A Proposed Regulatory Scheme, 28 DEPAUL L.
REV. 731 (1979). See also Asaro, supra note 16, at 93-101 (documenting and criticizing sterilization
abuse by physicians). Cf Comment, Sterilization Regulation: Government Efforts to Guarantee In-
formed Consent, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971 (1978) (acknowledging that regulations may both
protect right to choose sterilization by preventing abuse of patients by doctors and burden that right
by injecting state into doctor-patient relationship). Even outside the sterilization context, commen-
tators have written favorably about the concept of informed-consent statutes through which the
legislature specifies the required disclosures for medical treatment. See Andrews, supra note 176.
213. Cf Morrow, Women's Health Care and Informed Consent: Who Should Decide What Is
Best for Women-Patients or Doctors?. 9 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 553 (1978-79) (urging revision
of traditional doctor-patient relationship to require doctors to disclose information and women pa-
tients to make their own health care decisions).
214. See, eg., Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 186 n.2 (E.D. La. 1980) (challenge to
statute including detailed informed consent requirements by, inter alia, class consisting of" 'all wo-
men in Louisiana capable of bearing children who are now or may become pregnant and who desire
or may desire an abortion to be performed in Louisiana by the physician of their choice' ").
215. Although the comparison between abortion and sterilization for purposes of informed-con-
sent requirements is a useful one, a thorough analysis must consider a number of important distinc-
tions. While the purpose behind limits on consent to sterilization may be equivocal, compare Asaro,
supra note 16, at 93-101 (showing how women have been unwillingly sterilized) with McCabe v.
Nassau County Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971) (showing how women seeking steriliza-
tion had been denied that procedure), one can reliably infer an antiabortion motive from abortion
restrictions like Akron's informed consent requirements, see infra notes 216-20 & 257 and accompa-
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One tempting response is that "truly informed consent" provisions like
Akron's regularly appear as just one part of a comprehensive system of
abortion restrictions, enacted for the unmistakable purpose of curbing
abortion. Anti-abortion motives masquerade as concern for patient
choice.216 Though this feature alone-a legislative intent to undermine a
choice previously identified as constitutionally protected-ought to be
damning enough, the Supreme Court has never found antiabortion mo-
tives alone determinative. Rather the Court has considered abortion reg-
ulations individually,217 ignoring their place in a larger legislative
plan,218 and on some occasions it has approved governmental efforts to
limit abortion so long as those efforts do not go too far219 in thwarting
the protected choice.220
Another answer, based on a closer look at the content of specific statu-
tory consent requirements, focuses on the speculative, if not erroneous,
warnings of abortion complications 22' and details of fetal anatomy, 222
pain sensitivity,223 and legal status224 that these laws compel the physi-
nying text. The contrasting realities of abortion and sterilization practice are also significant. Co-
erced sterilization has a well-known history in this country. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Forced abortion plainly does not. The legal literature has
documented many cases of women in especially vulnerable situations, e.g., just after childbirth, who
"consent" to sterilization under extreme pressure from physicians. See, e.g., Asaro, supra note 16.
Yet one cannot so easily explain why a woman who did not want an abortion would visit an abortion
clinic, the most likely source of any imaginable pressure from a doctor to terminate a pregnancy.
But see supra note 210. These legal, historical, and factual distinctions may well support different
approaches to informed consent and required disclosure for each procedure.
216. See supra note 200.
217. E.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983);
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 292 (1984),juri. postponed, 105 S. Ct.
2015 (1985). The severability clauses contained in the statutes encourage this approach. See 462
U.S. at 425 n.8; 428 U.S. at 88-89 (appendix).
218. In other recent cases, the Court has invalidated facially neutral laws when it has found the
legislative motivation constitutionally impermissible. Eg., Hunter v. Underwood, 105 S. Ct. 1916
(1985) (Alabama provision disenfranchising those convicted of certain crimes violates equal protec-
tion because racial discrimination was a but-for motivation of its enactment). But see Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971) (earlier case rejecting consideration of legislative motive).
219. See supra note 3.
220. See, eg., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981) (in upholding Utah's parental notifi-
cation requirement, Court finds state action "encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent cir-
cumstances" to be "rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential
life"); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding funding restrictions designed to encourage
childbirth over abortion). See generally Appleton, supra note 3.
221. See, eg., 462 U.S. at 423 n.5 (quoting Akron ordinance).
222. See, eg., Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. at 206 n.76.
223. See, eg., Akron, 462 U.S. at 423 n.5; Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 782 (7th Cir. 1980),
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cian to recite. Obviously, communication of questionable or untrue in-
formation, whether by physician discretion or force of law, neither makes
the patient's consent more knowing nor enhances her choice. Because
almost all abortion patients understand the consequences of an abortion
to the fetus before consulting a physician about the procedure, 225 requir-
ing the explicit communication of such "facts" does not inform the pa-
tient at all. 226  The common knowledge exception to the informed
consent doctrine227 embodies this principle.
In addition, legislation in this area has been notably one-sided, usually
listing the risks and consequences of abortion without including compa-
rable coverage of the patient's only alternative course,228 continued preg-
nancy and childbirth, in fact the more hazardous of her choices.229
Women preferring to carry to term receive no state-mandated warn-
supplemented sub nom. Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984), prob. juris, noted sub nom.
Diamond v. Charles, 105 S. Ct. 2356 (1985).
224. See, eg., 462 U.S. at 423 n.5; 627 F.2d at 781 n.13.
225. See Note, supra note 180, at 707 n. 167. Cf Note, supra note 177, at 196 (even a woman
who knows abortion is an alternative to childbirth may not know "enough about abortion to make
her consent to childbirth informed").
In some contexts, moreover, even a woman who appreciates the consequences of abortion may not
understand without disclosure by her physician or his agent that particular methods of birth control
prevent implantation of fertilized eggs, rather than preventing fertilization. Cf. Charles v. Daley,
749 F.2d 452, 461-62 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding unconstitutional statute requiring doctor who
prescribes "abortifacient" method of birth control to inform patient he has done so; law intrudes on
physician-patient relation, foists on patient state's view that abortifacients cause death of unborn
children, and infringes individual decision-making in matters relating to contraception), prob. juris.
noted sub nom. Diamond v. Charles, 105 S. Ct. 2356 (1985); infra notes 261-85 and accompanying
text (examining hypothetical variation of Illinois statute).
226. This "information" may cause emotional distress. See Note, supra note 180, at 708. To the
extent the informed consent doctrine includes a therapeutic privilege, see supra note 176 and accom-
panying text; but see infra notes 278 and accompanying text, the theory is that such distressing
"information" does not promote a patient's right to self-determination. See Meisel, Expansion, supra
note 169, at 101 (therapeutic privilege ought to apply when information would make patient too
distraught to reach rational decision).
227. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., 462 U.S. at 423 n.5 (quoting Akron ordinance); Note, supra note 180, at 708-10 &
n. 171. It is true that the Akron ordinance requires the physician to inform the patient "of the
particular risks associated with her own pregnancy" and other information that he judges "relevant
to her decision as to whether to have an abortion to carry her pregnancy to term." Id. at 424 n.5.
But the statute, directed only at consent to abortion, not consent to childbirth, covers the conse-
quences and risks of abortion in considerably more detail than those presented by the alternative of
continued pregnancy. See also Womens Servs., P.C. v. Thone, 636 F.2d 206, 210 (8th Cir. 1980)
(holding unconstitutional a Nebraska informed consent statute requiring abortion patients to be ad-
vised "of the reasonably possible medical and mental consequences resulting from an abortion, preg-
nancy, and childbirth"), vacated on other grounds, 452 U.S. 911 (1981).
229. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163; see also Akron, 462 U.S. at 429 n.ll.
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ings.2 31 "Truly informed consent" requires a description of what each
option entails-including the option of not aborting.23
The United States Supreme Court offered its contributions to this sub-
ject in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,232
which invalidated the three provisions of the Akron ordinance noted ear-
lier. The Court's reasoning combined consideration of the legislature's
obvious antiabortion motives,233 for the first time identified as a constitu-
tional vice,234 together with generous deference to the physician's role
and discretion.235 The opinion also broke away from the Court's earlier
rhetoric by implicitly acknowledging the realities of modem abortion
clinic practice, where physicians serve chiefly as medical technicians but
not as counselors and decision-makers for each of their patients.236
230. One may reasonably argue that childbirth (and the continued pregnancy that precedes it) is
an alternative for which a patient must give informed consent. See Note, supra note 177, at 181. See
also Appleton, The Abortion-Funding Cases and Population Control An Imaginary Lawsuit (and
Some Reflections on the Uncertain Limits of Reproductive Privacy), 77 MicH. L. REV. 1688, 1699-
700 (1979) (today medical assistance and care almost always accompany childbirth).
231. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242-43, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972);
see also Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980) (informed
consent includes disclosure of material risks of refusal to submit to medical procedure).
The conclusion that "truly informed consent" necessarily requires consideration of all the options
carries particular force if the abortion cases protect a right to choose or decide. See supra notes 5-9
and accompanying text. Government action with respect to even one option inescapably affects the
entire range of alternatives. See Appleton, supra note 3, at 725. See also Andrews, supra note 176, at
192-93 (empirical research shows that discussing options in unequal degrees of detail skews patients'
choices).
232. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
233. The Court clearly considered the legislature's motives. See 462 U.S. at 444 (information
"designed" to persuade woman to withhold consent); id. at 445 (information "intended" to suggest
abortion is dangerous). This approach contrasts with other parts of the opinion in which the Court
focused instead on the legislation's effects. See id. at 438 (hospitalization requirement has "the effect
of inhibiting" second-trimester abortions). The Court did not, however, examine the effects of the
informed-consent requirements, Le., whether they in fact deterred women from choosing abortion.
234. See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text. The Akron Court distinguished its toler-
ance of anti-abortion motives in the abortion-funding cases. 462 U.S. at 444 n.33.
235. See 462 U.S. at 443-44:
It remains primarily the responsibility of the physician to ensure that appropriate informa-
tion is conveyed to his patient, depending on her particular circumstances. Danforth's
recognition of the State's interest in ensuring that this information be given will not justify
abortion regulations designed to influence the woman's informed choice between abortion
or childbirth.
236. For example, the Court held unconstitutional Akron's requirement that the attending phy-
sician personally counsel the abortion patient about the procedure, its risks, and its consequences.
462 U.S. at 446-49. Today, most abortions occur in clinics, and in most clinics nonphysicians coun-
sel the patients. See supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text. In addition to reflecting the realities
of clinic practice in its holding, the Court used language stressing the prominence of the woman, not
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Following the lead of some of the more thoughtful lower courts, which
had explained why protecting the physician ought to safeguard the wo-
man's choice,2 37 the Supreme Court found the flaw in the first part238 of
Akron's "truly informed consent" law to be the legislature's unreasona-
ble placement of "obstacles in the path of the doctor upon whom [the
woman is] entitled to rely for advice in connection with her decision. "239
As the Court elaborated, this kind of requirement violates the Constitu-
tion both because it attempts to discourage abortion through the trans-
mission of preselected information, much of dubious validity,24 and
because it impermissibly intrudes "upon the discretion of the pregnant
woman's physician, "241 contrary to Danforth's warning against confining
the physician in an "'undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket.' "242
Akron's mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period2 43 fell for this latter
reason alone, the invasion of physician discretion.2"
her doctor, in the constitutional analysis. See eg., 462 U.S. at 427 ("full vindication of the woman's
fundamental right necessarily requires that her physician" be allowed to exercise his medical discre-
tion); id. at 434 (additional cost to women of hospitalization requirement).
237. See, eg., Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 782 (7th Cir. 1980), supplemented sub nom.
Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Diamond v. Charles, 105
. Ct. 2356 (1985). The Court in Charles v. Carey relied on Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), an
unsuccessful privacy challenge to a New York law requiring physicians to identify patients receiving
prescriptions for particular drugs. W~halen had interpreted Doe v. Bolton to invalidate abortion re-
strictions that "encumbered the woman's exercise of [her] constitutionally protected right by placing
obstacles in the path of the doctor upon whom she was entitled to rely for advice in connection with
her decision." Id. at 604-05 n.33. Although Doe v. Bolton referred repeatedly to the "physician's
right" to administer medical care, see 410 U.S. at 197-98, 199, Whalen found any such right "deriva-
tive from, and therefore no stronger than, the patients'." 429 U.S. at 604. See also Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (state specifi-
cation of information violates "physician straitjacket" rule; "t]his is not impermissible because of
any perceived interference with rights of the physician [but rather] because it interferes with the
woman's right to consult a physician who is free from such state interference"), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), affd in part and rev'd in part, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88.
239. 462 U.S. at 445 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.33 (1977)).
240. See id at 444.
241. Id. at 445. In striking down the first part of Akron's informed-consent requirement, see
supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text, the Court not only condemned the city's effort to influ-
ence the patient's choice but also said that "[a]n additional, and equally decisive, objection to [this
provision] is its intrusion upon the discretion of the pregnant woman's physician." 462 U.S. at 445.
242. 462 U.S. at 445 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67
n.28 (1976)). See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
243. See supra text accompanying note 194.
244. 462 U.S. at 450. The Supreme Court recited but did not expressly adopt the finding by the
district court that Akron's waiting period increased the costs of abortions, nor did the Court explic-
itly accept plaintiffs' arguments that the waiting period creates additional health risks. Id Rather, a
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But the Court went on to point out that a state may require in general
terms, leaving "the precise nature and amount of... disclosure to the
physician's discretion and 'medical judgment,' "245 that the patient "be
told of the particular risks of her pregnancy and the abortion technique
to be used, and be given general instructions on proper postabortion
care." 24  The second informational provision of the Akron ordinance,247
which thus required the communication of some material that the Court
found acceptable, was nonetheless unconstitutional because it compelled
the attending physician to perform that task. In so holding, the Court
implicitly abandoned the illusion of the physician as the woman's per-
sonal counselor and moral decision-maker248 and approved instead the
fact that most abortions are performed in clinics where nonphysicians
counsel patients before they consent to the procedure. 249 According to
the Court, "the critical factor [in the state's interest in assuring a pa-
tient's informed and unpressured consent] is whether she obtains the nec-
essary information from a qualified person, not the identity of the person
from whom she obtains it."'250 The state cannot prohibit the physician's
delegation of the required communication 251 so long as the physician re-
mains "ultimately responsible for the medical aspects of the decision to
perform the abortion., 25
2
Have the results in Akron, which advance patients' interests in mini-
mizing the cost of abortions and in receiving abortion counseling from
those best able to provide it,253 finally resolved the tension between the
Court's systematic deference to the physician and the conflicting notion
physician will advise delay when he thinks the patient will benefit. Id. Cf Andrews supra note 176,
at 200-01 & n.197 (general advisability of waiting periods before other medical procedures).
245. 462 U.S. at 447.
246. Id. at 446-47.
247. See supra text accompanying note 193.
248. See supra notes 98-118 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text. Members of the Court had previously
expressed disapproval of this reality. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 641 n.21 (1979) (plurality
opinion); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 91 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
250. 462 U.S. at 448.
251. See id.
252. Id. But what does "medical" mean? See supra notes 104 & 105 and accompanying text.
253. Those challenging the Akron ordinance had argued and presented supporting data to the
Court that nonphysician counselors employed by abortion clinics performed the counseling role
more effectively than the attending physicians and at less cost to patients. See Respondents' and
Cross-Petitioners' Brief, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983), at 16-17 & n.32.
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(derived from both intuition and precedent 254) that the woman has at
stake a privacy right independent of and entitled to greater constitutional
protection than the interests of her doctor? Not really, for although the
outcome in Akron is completely defensible in the factual context
presented by the case,255 the broader implications of the opinion are un-
certain and susceptible of troubling conclusions about the Court's vision
of privacy. Putting aside what the Supreme Court condemned in Akron
as a "parade of horribles" 256 "designed not to inform the woman's con-
sent but rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether," '257 the larger
questions remain: Would a state-required "litany" '258 of accurate, mate-
rial259 and "two-sided ' ' 26  information, enforced by criminal penalties
against the physician, infringe the patient's right to choose? Why?
Consider a hypothetical variation of a recently challenged Illinois
abortion restriction that the Supreme Court may review during its 1985
term. 26  The court of appeals read the pertinent part of the statute to
require "physicians who prescribe or administer abortifacients to inform
their patients that they have done so. ' ' 2 6 2 The court of appeals held the
provision unconstitutional because the operative word, "abortifacient,"
incorporated the term "fetus," which another provision defined as "a
254. See supra notes 11 & 12 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
256. 462 U.S. at 445.
257. Id. at 444.
258. Id. "Miranda" warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), may provide an apt
analogy. See Capron, supra note 175, at 370; Meisel, "Exceptions", supra note 169, at 456 & n.141.
259. I use the word "material" here to describe information that not all patients know before
consulting a physician (or abortion counselor), see supra note 225 and accompanying text, and that
might influence a given woman's choice. The variation of the Illinois statute discussed in the text
accompanying infra notes 261-85 provides a useful example.
260. Here I mean a recitation of the risks and consequences of each alternative course of action,
e.g., continued pregnancy and childbirth, on the one hand, and abortion, on the other. Cf. supra text
at notes 228-29 (describing "one-sided" legislation).
261. See Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984), prob. jurit noted sub nonm Diamond v.
Charles, 105 S. Ct. 2356 (1985).
262. 749 F.2d at 461. This section of the statute, whose language would reach not only physi-
cians but also, for example, vendors of mutagenic pesticides, provides in its entirety:
Any person who sells any drug, medicine, instrument, or other substance which he knows
to be an abortifacient and which is in fact an abortifacient, unless upon prescription of a
physician, is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. Any person who prescribes or administers
any instrument, medicine, drug or other substance or device, which he knows to be an
abortifacient, and intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to inform the person for
whom it is prescribed or upon whom it is administered that it is an abortifacient commits a
Class C misdemeanor.
Id. at 456 (quoting Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended by S.B. 47).
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human being from fertilization until death. '2 63  According to the court,
the abortifacient-information requirement "not only intrude[d] upon the
medical discretion of the attending physician, but it also impermissibly
impose[d] the State's theory of when life begins on the physician's pa-
tient."2 4  Although the incorporation of unconstitutional assertions
about when human life begins necessarily dooms the regulation and the
Supreme Court should invalidate the Illinois law for this reason among
others, 265 suppose the legislature had enacted a similar provision without
such illegal references. Suppose this hypothetical provision, clearly di-
rected at physicians prescribing methods of birth control that prevent
implantation of fertilized ova but do not prevent fertilization, required a
description of how the particular preimplantation method is thought to
work266 and a statement of its effectiveness and risks, together with dis-
closure of alternative methods of birth control, their effectiveness, and
263. Id. at 462. The statute defined "abortifacient" to mean "any instrument, medicine, drug or
any other substance or device which is known to cause fetal death when employed in the usual and
customary use for which it is manufactured, whether or not the fetus is known to exist when such
substance or device is employed." Id. at 456 (quoting Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended by
S.B. 47).
264. Id. at 462.
265. Defining precisely "abortifacient" and its implications is difficult, and this difficulty sug-
gests void-for-vagueness problems in the Illinois statute that even the scienter elements, see supra
notes 262 & 263, may not cure. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979). Stedman's Medical
Dictionary defines "abortifacient" as "producing abortion," T. STEDMAN, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICIONARY 3 (22d ed. 1972), and defines "abortion" as "[g]iving birth to an embryo or fetus prior
to the stage of viability.. .," id Although the definition of "embryo" becomes operative beginning at
"conception," id. at 404, and "conception" is defined as "successful implantation of the blastocyst in
the uterine lining," id at 276, the terms "conception" and "fertilization" are often used interchange-
ably, see, eg., THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, supra note 38, at 22. Methods
of birth control that do not prevent fertilization but rather inhibit implantation of fertilized eggs may
therefore be considered "abortifacients." See id. at 249-50 (discussing how "morning-after pill" and
intrauterine devices work); Note, Criminal Law-Abortion-The "Morning-After Pill" and Other
Pre-Implantation Birth-Control Methods and the Law, 46 ORE. L. REv. 211 (1967) (pre-Roe analysis
of applicability of abortion restrictions to these methods); but see American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 293 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Pennsylvania statute
excluding such methods from definition of "abortion"), juris. postponed, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985).
Nonetheless, "fetus," the term used in Illinois' definition of "abortifacient," usually becomes applica-
ble well after implantation, see T. STEDMAN, supra, at 461. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159
(1973) (the pregnant woman "carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical defini-
tions of the developing young in the human uterus").
266. Because of the inherent ambiguity in the term "abortifacient," my hypothetical requirement
would probably suffer from the same vagueness problems as the actual Illinois statute if it used this
term. See supra note 265. As a result, a term such as "preimplantation method of birth control,"
although cumbersome, is preferable.
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their risks.26 7 Presumably, the court of appeals would have invalidated
even this hypothetical statute because, as the opinion put it, "[t]he State
may not treat women [who prefer preimplantation methods of birth con-
trol] inequitably in order to protect the emotional health of women who
oppose abortifacients. ' '268  But, from the perspective of the doctrine of
informed consent as well as the constitutional right of reproductive
choice, the issue should not be the proper balance between the competing
preferences of two classes of women sufficiently knowledgeable to reach a
decision. The real question should be whether the state can insure con-
stitutionally that all women who do not know how certain birth control
drugs and devices work learn such facts even if doing so forces some
women (regardless of their preference) to hear information they already
know.2
69
I find this example, based on an expanded and "sanitized" variation of
the Illinois law, to be a particularly provocative one for testing the Akron
Court's reasoning because I believe that many people--even well-edu-
cated individuals interested in matters of birth control-are unaware that
both intrauterine devices and the "morning-after pill" do not necessarily
prevent fertilization but rather most likely prevent implantation of fertil-
ized eggs.27 ° Many of these same individuals would regard that informa-
tion as material to their choice of a method of birth control.271 If some
physicians would decline to disclose such information to protect what
they perceive to be the emotional health of patients that they think
should use such methods of birth control,2 72 then would not the hypo-
267. Cf Morrow, supra note 213, at 578 (criticizing physicians who believe women should not
be informed of risks of birth control pills and arguing doctor should "explain to his woman patient
the risks of the use of birth control pills, the alternatives to the pills, and the risk of the
alternatives").
268. 749 F.2d at 462.
269. Cf Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1019 (1st Cir. 1981)
(analogizing to the law of evidence, the question is whether the "'prejudicial' efflect of even admit-
tedly relevant information outweighs its 'probative' value").
270. See THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, supra note 52, at 249-50; Note,
supra note 265.
271. I base my "empirical" conclusions about such knowledge and materiality on the consistent
student responses over the last six years in my Seminar on Reproductive Control at Washington
University School of Law.
272. See Morrow, supra note 213, at 578; THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE,
supra note 52, at 561-62 (female patients' relationship with doctors). See also J. CHILDRESS, supra
note 176, at 127-56 ("paternalistic deception, lies and nondisclosure" in health care). Although the
Supreme Court has repeatedly limited its analyses to the "model of the competent, conscientious,
and ethical physician," 462 U.S. at 448 n.39; see supra text at note 108, it is not at all clear that
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thetical requirement enhance the patient's self-determination? This hy-
pothetical requirement therefore forces us to consider whether
mandatory information statutes, which always constrain physician dis-
cretion, inevitably invade the patient's freedom to choose as well. 2"
Applying the Akron reasoning to the hypothetical restriction, a court
might find the intrusion on physician discretion decisive,2 74 quite apart
from whatever motives might have prompted the enactment. 275 In fact,
Akron's disapproval of government-fashioned "straitjackets" for doc-
tors276 would invalidate any specific disclosure requirement directed at
the physician, regardless of the accuracy, materiality, and "two-sided-
ness" of the information2 77 detailed by the state. This conclusion sug-
gests that the physician must always make the ultimate determination
about the particular information his patient does and does not receive.
To this extent, the Akron Court's stance tracks the traditional therapeu-
tic exception to the doctrine of informed consent, which gives the physi-
cian discretion to withhold information he believes would be harmful to
the patient. Yet commentators have criticized, and even advocated abol-
ishing, this exception because it undermines the right of self-determina-
tion.2 78 According to this aspect of Akron, then, the physician is not
simply the instrument of the abortion patient's independent choice,279
because his constitutionally protected discretion is the filter through
which she will acquire information to reach her decision. To say that the
physicians who paternalistically withhold information from their patients depart from that model.
See generally J. CHILDRESS, supra note 176. The Court relies on intraprofessional remedies, not
state legislation, for physicians who fall short of this model (see Doe, 410 U.S. at 199; Roe, 410 U.S.
at 166), but that may reatffrm one observation in this Article-that standards developed by the
medical profession ultimately determine whether any particular regulation of abortion will survive
constitutional challenge. See supra notes 57-90 and accompanying text. But see infra note 353 and
accompanying text.
273. No compelling state interest would support such regulation of birth control, but that con-
clusion would apply equally to informed consent provisions, like the one upheld in Danforth, 428
U.S. at 65-67, that cover even the first trimester of pregnancy.
274. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 216-20, 241-44 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
277. Cf supra text accompanying note 247 (ordinance provision compelling communication of
unobjectionable information invalid because of attending-physician requirement).
278. See supra note 176. Although the Supreme Court's approach is generally consistent with
current tort law, the commentators' criticism of the therapeutic exception in the tort doctrine (it
allows the doctor to negate the right of the patient to choose intelligently her own medical treat-
ment) would seem equally pertinent to any therapeutic exception engrafted on the constitutional
right to choose intelligently certain kinds of reproductive health care.
279. See supra text accompanying note 239.
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abortion decision is "hers" is to speak very loosely or to recite a fairy
tale, as Dr. Jay Katz has called the right of informed consent that tort
law has given to patients.28°
Perhaps unwilling to rely wholly on fairy tales, however, the Supreme
Court in Akron nodded approvingly at requirements like the second part
of Akron's ordinance, which addressed the risks of the particular pa-
tient's pregnancy, the abortion technique to be used, and general instruc-
tions on care, so long as the physician remains free to decide the precise
contours of each disclosure. 28 1 A court might construe the hypothetical
requirement to disclose the nature of preimplantation methods of birth
control as a sufficiently general command to fit within these parameters.
In allowing the state some room to legislate the disclosure of informa-
tion, the Akron Court recognized that the woman has interests that are
distinct from those of her physician and do not necessarily receive ade-
quate protection from the exercise of his medical discretion. Yet in com-
ing this far the Court avoided taking the next step-deciding whether the
woman's right of reproductive choice might even supercede the interests
of her physician; instead the Court reached an intriguing solution that
did not compel retreat from its previous elevation and protection of the
physician. Even Akron's inclusion of acceptable information in the ordi-
nance could not stand because it obligated the attending physician to
make the required disclosures.282 The "doctor knows best" approach
prevails in Akron, for even when the information is "not objectiona-
ble," '283 the state must defer to the judgment of the physician who may
conclude that someone other than himself should perform the counseling
role.284 The hypothetical derived from the Illinois statute, which also
mandates disclosure by the physician,"' would therefore fall even if it
guaranteed patient exposure to new, helpful and true information.
Looking beyond Akron's contextually appropriate results,286 it is per-
haps no coincidence that the Court has removed virtually all "obstacles"
280. See generally Katz, supra note 133 (arguing that law really defers to physician's discretion
even while speaking of patient's right of informed consent). See also J. CHILDRESS, supra note 176
(advocating limits on paternalism in health care).
281. See supra notes 245 & 246 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 250 & 251 and accompanying text.
283. See 462 U.S. at 446 n.37.
284. See id. at 448-49.
285. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 253 & 255 and accompanying text.
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from the physician's path28 7 while allowing the state to continue to im-
pose requirements on the patient. The state cannot force the doctor to
talk, but it can force the patient to listen. Although this outcome safe-
guards the physician's first amendment right,288 its impact on the wo-
man's privacy right is unclear.
If all mandatory information infringes the right to privacy (a conclu-
sion once suggested by the Court's fusion of physician and patient),28 9
the patient should have at least as much freedom as, if not more than, her
physician from a state-regulated relationship. Yet the Akron solution to
the informed-consent problem extricates the physician from the state's
grasp but not the patient. Alternatively, if some state-specified informa-
tion arguably protects the patient's reproductive privacy by insulating her
from the physician's preferences and thus enhancing her choice (a possi-
ble conclusion to draw from the hypothetical version of the Illinois stat-
ute),290 then why does the Constitution forbid the state to force the
doctor to bear the counseling role? Apart from the physician's first-
amendment claim, an issue not addressed in Akron,29 the constitutional
right at stake properly belongs to the patient, and the physician should
serve simply as the means for her to effectuate that right. In the abstract
a state requirement that the attending physician convey particular infor-
mation to the patient would seem no more "unreasonable" 29 2 than a state
requirement that some other "qualified individual" 293 communicate pre-
cisely the same information. Requiring the physician to participate in
counseling the patient before obtaining her consent may, for example,
enhance the patient's trust and improve the physician's decision-mak-
ing 94-both consequences that benefit the patient. Akron's undocu-
mented comparison between counseling by a physician and counseling by
287. See supra text at note 239.
288. In her dissent in Akron, Justice O'Connor noted that a state may well violate the first
amendment if the state requires physicians "to communicate its ideology." 462 U.S. at 472 n.16
(citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)). The challengers in Akron did not raise such
claims, however.
289. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 288.
292. 462 U.S. at 449 ("In light of these alternatives [allowing delegation of counseling, requiring
verification by physician of counseling, etc.], we believe that it is unreasonable for a State to insist
that only a physician is competent to provide the information and counseling relevant to informed
consent.").
293. Id at 448.
294. Andrews, supra note 176, at 205.
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a professional counselor does not explain why, from the perspective of
the patient's right, a state preference for the former over the latter is
unreasonable.295 Yet the Court could have emphasized the additional
financial burden of this requirement, as it did when it invalidated Ak-
ron's post first-trimester hospitalization rule,29 6 instead of equivocally
and half-heartedly referring to Cost.297 Or the Court could have invoked
evidence that nonphysician counselors actually performed the counseling
function better than physicians.29 ' The Akron Court took neither of
these paths, which would have revealed the interests at stake for the
patient.
In Akron the Court altered its rhetoric to speak more clearly of the
woman as right-holder, quietly abandoned its idealized view of the physi-
cian as decision-maker, and implicitly approved the clinic setting in
which most abortions are performed. At a deeper level, however, the
Court failed to articulate a coherent theory explaining the connection
between patient choice and informed consent, 299 and it came only to
verge of recognizing that the woman may have rights superseding those
of her doctor. One striking point is clear, nonetheless. The Court re-
fused to allow the state to place any meaningful burden on the physician
295. See 462 U.S. at 449.
296. Other questions of cost have evoked detailed analysis from the Justices and have sharply
divided the Court. See id. at 434-35 (discussing significant additional cost imposed by hospitaliza-
tion requirement); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,
490 (1983) (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J.) (cost of required tissue examination "does
not significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision"); id at 498 (opinion of Blackmun, J.,
joined by Brennan, Marshall, & Stevens, JJ.) (requirement of "a pathologist's report unquestionably
adds significantly to the cost of providing abortions").
This division on the Court may explain in part the majority's superficial analysis of the cost of
physician-counselors, an approach that may reflect a compromise.
297. See id. at 447 ("Requiring physicians personally to discuss the abortion decision, its health
risks, and consequences with each patient may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions,
though the record here does not suggest that ethical physicians will charge more for adhering to this
typical element of the physician-patient relationship.").
298. See Respondents' and Cross-Petitioners' Brief, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), at 16-17. The Supreme Court simply noted that the courts
below had made no findings "that the nonphysician counselors at the plaintiff abortion clinics are
not trained or qualified to perform [their] important function." 462 U.S. at 448.
299. Concluding that the Supreme Court has advanced no coherent understanding of patient
choice and informed consent leaves the Akron opinion unexplained and unsupported, offering no
clear guidance for subsequent legislative or judicial efforts. See Diamond v. Charles, 105 S. Ct. 2356
(1985) (noting probable jurisdiction in challenge to Illinois abortion restrictions); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985) (postponing further
consideration of jurisdiction in challenge to Pennsylvania abortion restrictions). The alternative ap-
proaches examined infra in Part III, however, fill the gap.
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while permitting the state to oversee the patient's receipt of information.
Although physicians plainly have important interests in practicing
medicine free from unwarranted state "entanglement, ' ' 3°° these interests
should not overshadow the more firmly grounded constitutional rights of
the abortion patient. Akron perpetuates the pattern established in previ-
ous cases, judicial solicitude for the physician.301 This persistent theme,
which pulls the physician to the center of the analysis, means that mod-
em privacy doctrine bears even less resemblance to its antecedents than
the. critics of the early reproductive-choice cases had contended, 30 2 and
that the "fairy tale" of informed consent in tort litigation30 3 has been
retold as constitutional law.
III. TOWARD A COHERENT ANALYSIS: ABORTION RESTRICTIONS
AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
Roe v. Wade's basic point, that the Constitution prohibits the state
from usurping from its citizens the intensely personal and sensitive
choice whether to terminate a pregnancy, embodies the most intelligible
conclusion the Court could have reached on the question before it.3°
Yet a doctrine of reproductive privacy makes little intuitive or legal sense
when it ties the underlying right to inevitably changing medical technol-
ogy and currently accepted medical practice;3 5 when it casts the doctor
as the decision-maker with a status equal to or greater than the individ-
ual most intimately involved, even on nonmedical issues;30 6 when it al-
lows government-funding programs to target reproductive health care for
300. See supra notes 149 & 158 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 57-167 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 11.
303. See Katz, supra note 133. This vision of privacy, examined through the lens of informed
consent, is consistent with Jay Katz's observation that the law of informed consent does not truly
protect patient autonomy but rather shields physician discretion. And it is a vision of privacy that
perpetuates paternalism. See generally J. CHILDRESS, supra note 176. But the solution does not
necessarily lie in state-prescribed disclosures. As Katz concludes:
Decision-making in medicine ought to be a joint undertaking and depends much more on
the nature and quality of the entire give-and-take process and not on whether a particular
disclosure has or has not been made. How to translate the ingredients of this process into
useful legal prescriptions which are respectful of patients' quest to maintain and impulse to
surrender autonomy as well as of physicians' unending struggle with omnipotence and
impotence is a difficult task which has not yet been undertaken.
Katz, supra note 133, at 173.
304. See, eg., Law, supra note 24; Tribe, supra note 67.
305. See supra notes 55-92 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 93-151 and accompanying text.
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uniquely disadvantageous treatment; 30 7 and when it offers no satisfactory
resolution to the difficulties posed by offensive yet arguably "protective"
informed-consent requirements."' Nonetheless, because women have
enjoyed increased freedom of choice as the result of the law's respect for
doctors, some writers supporting a woman's right of reproductive self-
determination may be willing to settle for the current approach.30 9
This very pragmatic position is not the only path now that an increas-
ing number of scholars have developed alternative, women-focused anal-
yses of reproductive choice. Although still awaiting the precision that
will come with use in litigation, the recent writing of Sylvia Law310 and
Donald Regan,3" as well as Kenneth Karst" 2 and Judge Ruth Bader
Ginsburg,3 13 goes far toward refining the existing protection of reproduc-
tive choice. Their work centers on a simple, incontrovertible fact,
presented most cogently by Sylvia Law: only women can become preg-
nant, give birth, and have abortions.314 Legislation that singles out abor-
tion (or pregnancy or childbirth) for differential treatment singles out
women for differential treatment; such laws thus raise issues of gender-
based discrimination3" 5 despite the Supreme Court's unwillingness to
recognize this point in some of its opinions.3 16 With respect to abortion
in particular, Law, Karst and Ginsburg appear generally to agree that
laws which uniquely restrict access to medically feasible and available
307. See supra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 168-303 and accompanying text.
309. See Asaro, supra note 16, at 60, 93, 102.
310. Law, supra note 24; Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 24.
311. Regan, supra note 25.
312. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 57-59 (1977).
313. Ginsburg, supra note 16.
314. See Law, supra note 24, at 955, 1016; Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 24, at 17-24. See also
Regan, supra note 25, at 1631 (only women become pregnant and need abortions).
315. See generally Law, supra note 24. See also Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv.
39, 81-83 (limits of antidiscrimination principle in litigation involving immutable physical sex
characteristics).
316. Compare Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) (upholding state insurance
system because pregnancy-based discrimination is not gender-based discrimination) with Michael M.
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1981) (plurality opinion) (upholding male-only statutory
rape prohibition because only women become pregnant and suffer disproportionate consequences of
sexual activity); id. at 498 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Court has finally acknowledged "that the capac-
ity to become pregnant is what primarily differentiates the female from the male"). See also Nash-
ville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (employer's failure to provide sick pay for employees
during pregnancy leave is not illegal sex discrimination under Title VII, but deprivation of seniority
after pregnancy leave is).
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services 317 not only purposely treat women differently from others seek-
ing health care,318 but also have the even more discriminatory impact of
denying women an equal opportunity to choose their own roles in soci-
ety.319 Regan's point differs, but he sees the issue as one of equal protec-
tion nonetheless; when the state denies women abortions just so that their
fetuses can survive until birth,320 the state forces these women to be good
samaritans at great potential cost to their physical and emotional
health.321 Yet no state imposes similar burdens on other individuals in
even remotely comparable circumstances.322 In Regan's phrase, abortion
restrictions uniquely forbid women to be "bad samaritans. ' '323
Viewing abortion restrictions from a woman-focused perspective does
not provide automatic answers to many of the difficult questions ad-
dressed in Roe v. Wade and the cases that followed: What ought to be
the governing standard of review? 324 Must a court review all abortion
laws with equal rigor?325 Can the state protect the fetus as a person?326
How far can it go to protect the fetus as something less than a full consti-
317. See Law, supra note 24, at 1016. Pregnancy is a natural process, but medicine and science
have developed techniques for safely interrupting that process. Any effort to justify restricting access
to safe abortion services on the ground that women should "accept their maternal destiny," Brief
Arnici Curiae, supra note 24, at 25, makes no more sense than an effort to justify restricting access
to, say, chemotherapy on the theory that those who contract cancer should accept their biological
fate.
318. Despite the Supreme Court's conclusions to the contrary in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974), and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 129 (1976), Congress' recognition that
pregnancy-based discrimination constitutes sex-based discrimination makes far more sense. See
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. V 1981). As a result, I consider
laws that purposely classify on the basis of pregnancy (or abortion) equivalent to laws that purposely
classify on the basis of gender. See Regan, supra note 25, at 1633; Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp.,
726 F.2d 1543, 1548 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (presuming that employer's policy applicable only to pregnant
women is facially discriminatory). See also supra note 316 (sometimes Court treats pregnancy-based
discrimination as sex-based discrimination).
319. Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 383; Karst, supra note 312, at 58; Law, supra note 24, at 1007,
1028; Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 24, at 21-24.
320. Regan, supra note 25, at 1574-76.
321. Id. at 1579-83 (cataloguing burdens).
322. Id. at 1621-33. Regan concludes that abortion restrictions contravene the constitutional
values of nonsubordination, freedom from physical invasion, and equal protection. Id. at 1639-40.
Law criticizqs Regan's bad-samaritan approach because it equates abortion with other "morally
wrong but legally protected" refusals to aid. Law, supra note 24, at 1022.
323. See Regan, supra note 25, at 1572.
324. See supra note 3.
325. See id
326. See Karst, supra note 312, at 58 ("principle of equal citizenship" is "not a means of defining
who a person is"); Law, supra note 24, at 1020-21 (equally difficult under privacy and sex-equality
approaches to determine whether state has compelling interest in restricting abortion). But see Re-
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tutional person?3 27 Law explains how and why she would apply a com-
pelling state purpose test to any law "governing reproductive biology
[that has] a significant impact in perpetuating either the oppression of
women or culturally imposed sex-role constraints on individual free-
dom." '32 8 This strict scrutiny brings the analysis very close to the Court's
framework in Roe,329 which authorizes the state to prohibit all but medi-
cally necessary abortions upon viability.33 Similarly, Regan's "bad-sa-
maritan" approach would apply a heightened scrutiny to abortion-based
classifications33' and would allow state prohibitions at the end of the sec-
ond trimester, the time of viability.332
Although beginning at a very different starting point from Roe, each of
these alternatives approaches Roe's final result. But they do so without
burying what is essentially a woman's right in a formula that fixates on
the prerogatives of the physician.
How do these alternative routes to Roe's result respond to the difficul-
ties that the medical model has generated and to the issues posed in re-
cent litigation?
The predicted "collision" '333 between viability and the protected first
trimester 334 is one of the most problematic consequences of the current
doctor-centered formula's dependence on changing technology. Law de-
nies the imminence of the collision,335 and this denial allows her to con-
cede that postviability protection of fetal life could be a compelling state
interest that justifies state interference with abortion freedom. 336 But
Law's own observation that "[c]ontrol of reproduction is the sine qua
gan, supra note 25, at 1640-41 (argument based on samaritan doctrine supports abortion freedom
even if state regards fetus as a person).
327. See Ely, supra note 10, at 926 ("Dogs are not 'persons in the whole sense' nor have they
constitutional rights, but that does not mean the state cannot prohibit killing them").
328. Law, supra note 24, at 1008-09.
329. Law's analysis would find compelling state interests in addition to those so recognized in
Roe. Specifically, her approach would allow "a compelling state interest to be established in relation
to the broader substantive concerns of sex equality, including the oppression of women and the
constraints of traditional sex roles." Id. at 1011.
330. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
331. Regan, supra note 25, at 1630-33.
332. Id. at 1642-43.
333. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
334. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
335. Law, supra note 24, at 1023-24 n.245 (empirical evidence cited by Justice O'Connor does
not support her claim that first-trimester viability will soon be possible).
336. See id. at 1023-25 & n.247.
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non of women's capacity to live as equal people" 337 suggests an addi-
tional response. If viability should ever occur early in pregnancy, then
protection of viable fetal life may not be a sufficiently compelling state
interest to override so completely a woman's opportunity to terminate a
pregnancy. When Roe v. Wade held that the state must allow therapeu-
tic abortions after viability,338 the Court established that even compelling
governmental interests do not defeat all competing claims. Yet the
Court's present balancing test, with its emphasis on medical technology,
might tolerate the obliteration of abortion freedom by early viability. A
balancing test based on gender equality would more easily avoid that
result, given the inseparable link between gender equality and reproduc-
tive self-determination.339
Regan's approach also evades the pitfalls threatened by technological
change. To Regan, the beginning of the third trimester, the time at
which Roe placed fetal viability,34 is important not because it signals the
capacity for extrauterine survival, but because it marks a point at which
one might justifiably conclude under the samaritan doctrine that the wo-
man has "waived her right of non-involvement with the fetus." '341 Her
wish to terminate aid to the fetus comes too late. Relocating the viability
point will not alter the appropriate time to conclude that the pregnancy
has continued too long for a woman to invoke her equal right to be a bad
samaritan.342
Under a woman-centered approach, technology's twin, "accepted
medical practice," would no longer dominate the constitutional inquiry.
In an equal protection analysis accepted practice might serve as one da-
tum to help determine whether the state has singled out abortion patients
(and thus women) for disadvantageous or burdensome requirements not
imposed on those undergoing comparable medical procedures. 343
337. Id. at 1028.
338. See 410 U.S. at 163-64. Regan claims that his approach offers a firmer basis for this result
than does the Court's opinion. See Regan, supra note 25, at 1642 (One "must admit that there is no
other case in which we would even consider requiring one individual to sacrifice his life or health to
rescue another.").
339. See Law, supra note 24, at 1028.
340. 410 U.S. at 160.
341. Regan, supra note 25, at 1643.
342. Regan finds "a line at the beginning of the third trimester" a reasonable compromise be-
tween the competing interests of the pregnant woman and the state. Id.
343. A reference to standard medical practice would reveal the other medical procedures with
which abortion ought to be compared. If the legislature has regulated abortion more strictly than
these medically comparable procedures, then the equal protection analysis proposed here would
[V/ol. 63:183
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Although under its privacy approach the Court has not consistently con-
demned a state's discriminatory treatment of abortion 3" or its imposi-
tion of an "extra layer . . . of regulation" ' 5 even during the first
trimester,"' such legislation has both a discriminatory purpose and ef-
fect. When such legislation reduces access to abortion, it undermines
women's opportunities to determine their own reproductive fates and to
choose their own positions in society.347 But even when such laws do not
limit access, they demean women by perpetuating stereotypes of women
as a special class of medical patients in need of governmental
protection. 48
Missouri's required postabortion pathology reports, an issue that di-
vided the Court in Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Inc. v. Ash-
croft,34 9 provide a useful test. The Justices could not agree on whether
the requirement comported with "accepted medical practice., 350  But
whether or not the requirement met that test, it singled out abortion for
such regulation.351 With respect to other medical procedures, patients
injured by deviations from standard medical practice can initiate mal-
practice litigation; the state simply assumes that they are sufficiently
competent to obtain proper health care and to seek redress when they
receive something less. 352  Returning "accepted medical practice" to its
apply. Standard medical practice might thus contribute to the threshhold inquiry but it would not,
as it does under the current privacy approach, be the determinative constitutional variable. See
supra notes 55-92 and accompanying text.
344. Compare Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) ("Abortion is inherently different from
other medical procedures, because no other procedure involves the purposeful termination of a po-
tential life.") with Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973) ("We are not cited to any other surgical
procedure made subject to committee approval as a matter of state criminal law.").
345. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66 (1976) (uphold-
ing Missouri's written-consent requirement despite challengers' argument that Roe prohibits state
from regulating abortion more closely than other medical procedures).
346. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (during first trimester, decision "may be effectuated by an abortion
free of interference by the state").
347. See Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 383; Karst, supra note 312, at 58; Brief Amici Curiae, supra
note 24.
348. See Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 24, at 42-47 (unique hospitalization requirements for
abortions "reflect and reinforce the assumption that woman are 'innately inferior' in their capacity to
make appropriate medical decisions in consultation with their physicians").
349. 462 U.S. at 486-90; id. at 494-98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
350. See supra notes 89 & 90 and accompanying text.
351. The Missouri Administrative Code requires a pathologist's report following all but minor
surgery performed in hospitals. See 462 U.S. at 486 (plurality opinion); id. at 497 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Early abortions, however, are considered minor surgical procedures, see Akron, 462
U.S. at 444 n.35, and are not generally performed in hospitals, see id. at 436.
352. See generally W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 91, at 187.
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normal role as a component of the law of torts makes far more sense than
using the concept to define the boundaries of the right to privacy. 353 And
returning this concept to its ordinary role avoids the harmful stereotyp-
ing of women imposed by even those laws that single out abortion for
requirements consistent with accepted medical practice.354
The preceding analysis goes far toward resolving the remaining diffi-
culties in the Court's current approach. Government funding programs
that exclude therapeutic abortions while subsidizing all other medically
necessary health care services pose serious equal protection problems, as
Justice Stevens noted in Harris v. McRae.35' This uniquely unfavorable
treatment of therapeutic abortion presents an even clearer case of sex-
based discrimination than the uniquely unfavorable treatment of normal
pregnancy.3 5 6 And it is discrimination that, while oppressing women
and channeling them into narrow gender-determined roles in society,
35 7
could not survive Law's compelling-state-purpose standard.35 8
Recognizing the sex discrimination inherent in laws that single out
abortion under either Law's or Regan's approach leaves no doubt that
the woman, not her physician, decides whether to terminate her preg-
353. See supra notes 73-90 and accompanying text.
354. In other words, an abortion patient needs no more legislative protection than any other
patient. If her physician should have consulted a pathologist according to standard practice but
failed to do so and the patient suffered injuries as a result, then she can sue him as any other patient
might under similar circumstances. Cf Roe, 410 U.S. at 166 (usual judicial remedies). By contrast,
the Missouri statute imposes criminal penalties on physicians who fail to comply. See Mo. REv.
STAT. § 188.075 (Supp. 1984) (misdemeanor).
355. 448 U.S. 297, 351-57 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 385.
356. As a result of the Hyde Amendment, abortion is virtually the only medically necessary
health care service excluded from Medicaid coverage. See 448 U.S. at 322, 325 n.28. By contrast, in
the cases in which the Court declined to recognize as sex-based discrimination the uniquely unfavor-
able treatment of pregnancy, the Court arguably relied on the often "normal" and "voluntary" na-
ture of the condition. See, eg., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (pregnancy
is not a "disease" and is often voluntarily undertaken and desired). One could not make similar
assumptions about conditions that make pregnancy termination medically necessary, e.g., cancer or
diabetes. See 448 U.S. at 339-40 (Marshall, L, dissenting) (cataloguing situations in which the Hyde
Amendment withholds funds for medically necessary abortions). The physical and emotional effects
of such abortion discrimination are thus probably more severe than the financial (and perhaps emo-
tional) effects of the sort of pregnancy discrimination challenged in Gilbert.
357. Governmental refusals to subsidize only elective abortions, while subsidizing childbirth,
would also have this role-channeling effect. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upheld as
constitutional).
358. See Law, supra note 24, at 1016-17 n.219. Regan's thesis, on the other hand, would not
compel the Court to reach different results in the abortion-funding cases. See Regan, supra note 25,
at 1644-45.
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nancy.359 The physician will contribute medical advice and will often
effectuate her decision, 3" but he can neither resolve the personal and
moral issues for her nor choose her role in society.3 6 '
One of the most satisfying results of Law's analysis is its easy resolu-
tion of the difficulties presented by even "clean" informed-consent provi-
sions,362 like the hypothetical version of Illinois' "abortifacient"-
disclosure rule.363 When the state singles out abortion patients or female
birth-control patients for special protection from their physicians by
mandating waiting periods and detailed disclosure requirements, the
state perpetuates outmoded and pernicious stereotypes of women as in-
decisive and incompetent health-care consumers, incapable of obtaining
necessary information and time for reflection without paternalistic gov-
ernment intervention. 36" No compelling state interest supports this inter-
vention. 65 If and when the state prescribes specific disclosures for other
kinds of health care for both male and female patients366 and penalizes in
359. Cf. supra notes 93-151 and accompanying text (physician as decision-maker).
360. See supra notes 119-33 and accompanying text (empirical reports of abortion decision-
making).
361. Ginsburg writes of abortion as implicating "a woman's autonomous charge of her full life's
course," Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 383. Karst relates abortion to "a woman's claim of the right to
control her own social roles," Karst, supra note 312, at 58. Law phrases the issue as "a woman's
capacity for individual self-determination," Law, supra note 24, at 1017, while Regan sees abortion
as the moral question whether to aid one in peril, Regan, supra note 25. In addition, as the Court
noted in Roe v. Wade, one's position on abortion requires choices among various conflicting religious
and moral beliefs about matters not susceptible of definitive resolution. 410 U.S. at 116, 159. Is a
pregnant woman's physician the appropriate individual to decide her "social role" or her moral
beliefs?
362. See supra notes 168-303 and accompanying text.
363, See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
364. See Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 24, at 26-39.
365. The Court has noted the "stressful" nature of the abortion decision, Planned Parenthood of
Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976), but other surgery patients undoubtedly experience
stress as well.
366. Even those states that have codified the informed consent doctrine, see generally Andrews,
supra note 176, have enacted general statutes much less specific than the abortion-information re-
quirements. Yet one notable exception provides an interesting counterpoint to this discussion: A
Massachusetts statute specifically gives every breast-cancer patient in a hospital or comparable facil-
ity the right to be "provided by the physician in the facility" "complete information on all alterna-
tive treatments which are medically viable." MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 70E (Michie/Law. Coop.
Supp. 1985). Because men so rarely contract breast cancer and because the legislature undoubtedly
envisioned the statute's beneficiaries as female, I regard this law as a gender-based classification.
Like abortion-information statutes, it promotes a stereotype of women as particularly vulnerable
medical patients needing special legislative protection. But does it serve a compelling state interest?
Have breast cancer patients often chosen radical mastectomies because physicians have "oppressed"
them by giving them less than complete information about alternative treatments? See THE BOSTON
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an evenhanded way a physician's failure to comply,367 then we may justi-
fiably yield to the tempting conclusion that some such laws enhance the
right of self-determination.368
The foregoing analysis would invalidate all of the required oral-disclo-
sure and printed-information provisions scheduled for Supreme Court re-
view in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists369 and Diamond v. Charles.370 Pennsylvania's special abor-
tion-reporting requirements 371 would probably fall as well, to the extent
they suggest in the absence of a compelling interest that women patients
are particularly vulnerable to consulting "shoddy practitioners" '372 and
especially in need of government oversight.373
Other challenged provisions that become operative after fetal viabil-
ity374 may appear to withstand Law's compelling-state-purpose test.37 5
WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLEcrivE, supra note 52, at 533-35. Law might well find the Massa-
chusetts provision narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest related "to the broader
substantive concerns of sex equality, including the oppression of women and the constraints of tradi-
tional sex roles." Law, supra note 24, at 1011.
367. Outside the abortion context, informed consent statutes generally codify the common-law
doctrine and thus provide legislative standards for malpractice litigation. See generally Andrews,
supra note 176. Abortion-information statutes, however, impose criminal penalties on the physician,
see, eg., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 425 (1983), or
specify loss of his license for failure to comply, see, eg., American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 305-06 (3d Cir. 1984),juris. postponed, 105 S. Ct. 2015
(1985).
368. See supra notes 269-303 and accompanying text.
369. 737 F.2d 283, 295-96,298 (3d Cir. 1984) (informed-consent and printed-information provi-
sions enforced by license revocation and criminal penalties),juris. postponed, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985).
370. Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452, 461-62 (7th Cir. 1984), prob. juris noted sub nom. Dia-
mond v. Charles, 105 S. Ct. 2356 (1985).
371. The court of appeals upheld the requirement that abortion facilities file reports subject to
public disclosure containing information about the facilities and their affiliates. 737 F.2d at 297-98.
See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 613 F. Supp. 656 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (subsequent preliminary injunction against reporting requirement). The court struck
down detailed reporting requirements imposed on the physician about each abortion performed. 737
F.2d at 301-02. See 613 F. Supp. 656.
372. 737 F.2d at 298 (upholding reporting requirement for abortion facilities because "state has
proffered important justification that the provision will help insure that shoddy practitioners may
not hide behind the corporate veil"). See 613 F. Supp. 656 (subsequent preliminary injunction
against reporting requirement).
373. See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
374. See 749 F.2d at 459-60 (Illinois standard of care for aborting viable fetuses unconstitution-
ally encroaches on attending physician's medical judgment because statute fails to specify who deter-
mines viability); id. at 460-61 (standard of care for abortions of possibly viable fetuses
unconstitutional because it interferes with woman's right to receive unimpeded medical judgment);
737 F.2d at 298-300 (in absence of convincing evidence of "unconstitutional chill," Pennsylvania's
prohibition of postviability abortions is constitutional); id. at 300 (provision that abortions on viable
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But like the Court in Roe v. Wade,3 76 she would require the legislature to
tailor such rules as narrowly as possible,3 77 avoiding any encroachment
on the previability period.3 78 Moreover, even Roe dictated that courts
must balance competing interests after the state has shown a compelling
reason for its restriction. 379 Thus the Court must consider any oppres-
sive consequences of these postviability measures, as the court of appeals
did when it found unconstitutional Illinois' standard of care for aborting
a fetus "known to be viable." 38
0
IV. CONCLUSION
As the Court has turned from questions of contraception to issues of
abortion,38' it has increasingly transformed the values underlying consti-
tutional "privacy" from protection of an individual's right of reproduc-
tive self-determination to an encomium to the medical profession. The
abortion cases now awaiting review force the Supreme Court to address
some of the troubling implications produced by its preoccupation with
deference to doctors and the standards of their practice, so evident in the
1983 opinions.382 Just as the Court once realized that the individuals
unified in the married couple to which the Justices had accorded consti-
tutional privacy merit separate consideration and protection,38 3 so too
fetuses be performed by the method most likely to produce live birth, in absence of significantly
greater risk to the mother, is unconstitutional for failure to make maternal health paramount consid-
eration); id. at 300-01 (second physician requirement for postviability abortions invalid for similar
reasons).
375. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
376. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
377. Law, supra note 24, at 1017 (law governing reproductive biology must be "best means for
meeting a compelling state purpose").
378. For example, Illinois' standard of care for aborting "possibly viable fetuses" would fall on
this ground. See 749 F.2d at 460-61.
379. 410 U.S. at 163-64 (even compelling state interest in protecting viable fetuses must give way
to considerations of maternal life and health).
380. The court overturned this provision because it failed to specify whether the physician's or
his assistant's assessment of viability would control. This uncertainty in turn hampers a woman's
right to receive her physician's unimpeded medical judgment. 749 F.2d at 459-60.
381. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception) with Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion).
382. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Simopoulos
v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
383. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (right to privacy belongs to
married couple) with Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (right to privacy belongs to
"individual, married or single").
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must the Court now "uncouple" the abortion patient's constitutional
rights from the interests of her physician.384
The abortion patient's rights, unlike the interests of her physician-
however important the latter may be-have solid roots in the Constitu-
tion. As scholars have recently recognized, reproductive self-determina-
tion is a logical and inseparable part of any meaningful inquiry into
gender-based discrimination and gender equality. Reconsidering re-
straints on reproductive freedom from this equal-protection perspective
offers not only a firmer constitutional foundation than the Court's cur-
rent methodology but also a more coherent framework for analysis. This
framework resolves the unnecessary difficulties created by the medical
model, provides answers for questions raised in current abortion litiga-
tion, and prevents the physician's role in reproductive medical proce-
dures from eclipsing the woman's stake in overturning abortion
restrictions.
Instead of presenting the opportunity to overrule Roe v. Wade,385 as
some have suggested,38 6 the cases now before the Court invite it to clarify
and strengthen its protection of what it must have recognized as the real
issue all along: "a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy."
387
384. I am indebted to Janet Benshoof for suggesting the comparison of the married couple and
the "couple" composed of the doctor and his abortion patient. Telephone interview, supra note 120.
385. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
386. See, e-g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, Thorn.
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984), jurs.
postponed, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985).
387. 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
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